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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays that broadly deal with the growth and
development of economies across time and space.
Chapter one is motivated by the fact that agricultural labor productivity is key for
understanding aggregate cross-country income differences. One important proximate cause
of low agricultural productivity is the low use of intermediate inputs, such as fertilizers, in
developing countries. This paper argues that farmers in poor countries rationally choose
to use fewer intermediate inputs because it limits their exposure to large uninsurable risks.
I formalize the idea in a dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete markets,
subsistence requirements, and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Quantitatively, the model
accounts for two-thirds of the difference in intermediate input shares between the richest
and poorest countries. This has important implications for cross-country productivity. Rel-
ative to an identical model with no productivity shocks, the addition of agricultural shocks
amplifies per capita GDP differences between the richest and poorest countries by nearly
eighty percent.
Chapter two deals with the changes in college completion in the United States over
time. In particular, this paper develop a dynamic lifecycle model to study the increases in
college completion and average IQ of college students in cohorts born from 1900 to 1972.
I discipline the model by constructing historical data on real college costs from printed
government reports covering this time period. The main finding is that that increases in
college completion of 1900 to 1950 birth cohorts are due primarily to changes in college
costs, which generate a large endogenous increase in college enrollment. Additionally,
evidence is found that supports cohorts born after 1950 underpredicted sharp increases in
the college earnings premium they eventually received. Combined with increasing college
costs during this time period, this generates a slowdown in college completion, consistent
with empirical evidence for cohorts born after 1950. Lastly, the rise in average college stu-
i
dent IQ cannot be accounted for without a decrease in the variance of ability signals. This
is attributed the increased precision of ability signals primarily to the rise of standardized
testing.
Chapter three again deals with cross-country income differences. In particular, it is
concerned with the fact that cross-country income differences are primarily accounted for
by total factor productivity (TFP) differences. Motivated by cross-country empirical evi-
dence, this paper investigates the importance individuals who operate their own firms be-
cause of a lack of other job opportunities (need-based entrepreneurs). I develop a dynamic
general equilibrium labor search model with with entrepreneurship to rationalize this mis-
allocation across occupations and assess its role for understanding cross-country income
differences. Developing countries are assumed to have tighter collateral constraints on en-
trepreneurs and lower unemployment benefits. Because these need-based entrepreneurs
actually have a comparative advantage as workers, they operate smaller and less productive
firms, lowering aggregate TFP in developing countries.
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Chapter 1
AGRICULTURAL RISK, INTERMEDIATE INPUTS, AND CROSS-COUNTRY
PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES
1.1 Introduction
Differences in agricultural labor productivity between the richest and poorest countries are
significantly larger than differences in aggregate labor productivity. This point has been
made recently by Caselli (2005) and Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008). In spite of this, the
least developed countries in the world employ over eighty percent of their population in
the agricultural sector. Since these countries employ such a large fraction of their popu-
lation in a particularly unproductive sector, basic accounting suggests that understanding
agricultural productivity differences are key in understanding aggregate differences.
One possible cause of agricultural productivity differences is that farmers in devel-
oping countries use fewer intermediate inputs, such as fertilizer. Empirically, the interme-
diate input share in agriculture is positively correlated with per capita income, and ranges
ranges from a low of 0.04 in Uganda to 0.40 in the United States. Moreover, I document
in Section 1.2 that this positive cross-country correlation between the sectoral intermediate
input share and income does not exist in other sectors, suggesting that it may be an impor-
tant margin for understanding why the agricultural sector exhibits significantly lower labor
productivity than the nonagricultural sector in developing countries. The goal of this paper
is to provide a theory to understand the cross-country correlation between the agricultural
intermediate input share and per capita income, and in turn, quantitatively assess its role
for cross-country productivity differences.
The basic idea put forth here is that the relatively low intermediate input intensity
in developing countries is a rational response to the risk generated by agricultural produc-
tivity shocks. Because intermediate decisions are made before the realization of shocks
(e.g. weather), the absence of insurance markets requires farmers to internalize the impact
1
this choice will have on ex-post consumption. In particular, purchasing a large amount of
intermediate inputs, then getting hit with a bad shock (e.g. drought) leads to extremely
low consumption. The extent to which this consideration impacts the ex-ante intermediate
choice depends critically on the income level of farmers. Low shock realizations are cer-
tainly bad for everyone, but they are particularly disastrous for farmers in extremely poor
countries, since consumption moves dangerously close to subsistence. These farmers are
less willing to take on the risk associated with intermediate inputs usage, thus driving down
labor productivity in developing countries.
I formalize this idea in a dynamic general equilibrium model in which farm in-
puts are chosen jointly with consumption. Farmers therefore maximize expected utility
instead of expected profit, consistent with a large empirical literature reviewed by Mor-
duch (1995). I further assume that farmers in all countries face idiosyncratic productivity
shocks, incomplete markets, and subsistence requirements. These features imply that each
possible shock realization is weighted not only by the probability of the shock, but also
the farmer’s realized marginal utility. As total factor productivity (TFP) decreases in poor
countries, a farmer’s incomes move closer to subsistence. Marginal utility at low shock
realizations increases relative to farmers in rich countries, and therefore implies that poor
farmers put relatively more weight on bad potential outcomes. This extra weight on low re-
alizations shows up as a wedge between the profit-maximizing marginal value and price of
intermediate inputs, and causes farmers to decrease their ex-ante intermediate input choice.
Aggregating over all farmers therefore generates a positive correlation between per capita
income and the intermediate input share, even though all underlying farm technologies are
Cobb-Douglas. As developing countries use fewer intermediate inputs, agricultural labor
productivity decreases.
Quantifying the implications of the model for cross-country productivity requires
taking a stand on two key features of the economy. The first is the distribution of productiv-
ity shocks in agriculture. The distribution of shocks controls the probability of getting a low
2
realization, which in turn controls the probability of consumption being near subsistence.
I estimate the distribution of productivity shocks with plot-level data drawn from eight
Indian villages from the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT) Village Level Surveys. This data set contains daily diaries of input and output
usage from over 8000 plots, and has the benefit of recording a vast array of inputs and
output quantities and values. The estimated shock distribution implies the probability of
getting a shock less than forty percent of the mean is approximately ten percent, suggesting
that farmers face quite a bit of risk.
Second, as pointed out by Aiyagari (1994) and Deaton (1991), a countervailing
force is that individuals can limit the distortionary impact of risk through savings. I assume
that savings is limited to storage of agricultural output, which is consistent with observed
responses to shocks found by Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas (1998) and Kazianga and Udry
(2006). I discipline the savings technology by utilizing a new set of storage depreciation
rates from Africa, constructed by the African Postharvest Loss Information System. De-
preciation ranges from ten to thirty percent, suggesting that while in principle farmers can
save their way away from this risk, in practice it is extremely costly.
The main quantitative exercise then compares the stationary equilibria of a rich and
a poor economy, which are calibrated to capture the relevant differences between the richest
and poorest countries in the world. The rich economy is calibrated to match key sectoral
features of the United States, including the intermediate input share and employment share
in agriculture. The poor economy differs along three dimensions. It has lower economy-
wide TFP, intermediate inputs are more costly, and the depreciation of agricultural storage
is higher. Naturally, these exogenous differences generate lower labor productivity in the
poor economy. To isolate the impact of the theory developed here, I ask how much larger
productivity differences are in the model with shocks, relative to the identical model with
no productivity shocks in the agricultural sector.
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The quantitative results imply that the seemingly sub-optimal intermediate input
choices in agriculture are in fact optimal responses by small-scale farmers to large risk,
and a key factor affecting labor productivity across countries. The calibrated model pre-
dicts that the poor economy has an intermediate input share of 0.22, compared to the U.S.
intermediate share of 0.40. This is fifty eight percent of the difference found in the data,
in which the poorest countries have intermediate input shares that average 0.09. By virtue
of the assumed Cobb-Douglas production technologies, any predicted difference in the in-
termediate input shares is due entirely to the addition of agricultural productivity shocks.
These predicted differences in intermediate input shares then amplify the output per worker
differences generated by exogenous factors. Relative to an identical model without produc-
tivity shocks, the addition of shocks in the agricultural sector amplifies agricultural output
per worker differences by slightly over forty percent and GDP per worker differences by
seventy five percent.
This paper joins recent work by Jones (2011), Koren and Tenreyro (2012), and the
aforementioned Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) by emphasizing the role of intermediate
inputs for economic development. I differ by focusing on the role of productivity shocks
for depressing intermediate input intensity in developing countries, and rely on the interac-
tion of these shocks with incomplete consumption insurance. This Bewley (1986)-Aiyagari
(1994) framework has been exploited by a number of recent papers to study cross-country
productivity, including Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011a) and Buera and Shin (2013),
though these papers generate input misallocation through financial distortions. I gener-
ate similar deviations from undistorted profit-maximization by relying on the inability of
firm owner-operators to insure their own consumption, more along the lines of Midrigan
and Xu (2012). Their focus on the manufacturing sector yields a much smaller quantitative
impact. Due to the importance of the agricultural sector in developing countries, and in
particular small-scale farming, the quantitative results here suggest that misallocation due
to uninsurable risk is an important margin for understanding labor productivity.
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As it specifically relates to intermediate input usage in agriculture, this theory stands
in contrast to the recent work of Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011). Backed by exper-
imental evidence from western Kenya, they develop a theory in which under-investment
in fertilizer is a result of present-biased farmers who do not necessarily understand their
preferences. These farmers delay fertilizer purchases until the last moment, then due to
their lack of knowledge of their own preferences, may not buy fertilizer at all. Here, under-
investment is a rational response to large uninsurable risks in the agricultural sector, though
both theories suggest a role for properly executed subsidies to intermediate purchases. The
importance of uninsurable risk is supported by recent empirical work including Karlan et al.
(2012) and Zerfu and Larson (2010).
This paper is not, however, the first to utilize the agricultural sector to better un-
derstand aggregate income differences. Other explanations include work by Adamopoulos
and Restuccia (2011) on distortions limiting farm size, Lagakos and Waugh (2012) on oc-
cupational selection, and the possibility of mismeasurement due to home production by
Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2004) or under-estimation of value added by Herrendorf
and Schoellman (2012). None consider the role of productivity shocks for understanding
input decisions. A number of these theories can be easily embedded in the framework
developed here, which would serve only to magnify the quantitative results.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides motivating evidence
of intermediate input share differences in a cross section of countries. Section 1.3 describes
the model. Section 1.4 shows how the interaction of productivity shocks and subsistence
requirements theoretically generate differences in the intermediate input share across coun-
tries. Turning to the quantitative work, Section 1.5 details the calibration and Section 1.6
presents the quantitative results of the model. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
5
1.2 Motivating Evidence
In this section, I first show that the intermediate input share in agriculture is positively
correlated with per capita GDP in a cross section of countries. In Section 1.2, I show
that this positive correlation is limited to the agricultural sector. The manufacturing and
service sectors exhibit no such relationship between intermediate input shares and income,
supporting the hypothesis that differences in intermediate input shares can help explain
why agriculture is particularly unproductive in developing countries.
Intermediate Input Shares Across Countries
The intermediate input share in agriculture of country j is
X̂ j :=
p jxX j
p jaY
j
a
(1.2.1)
where X is the quantity of nonagricultural intermediate inputs, such as fertilizer, and Ya is
the quantity of agricultural output. The prices faced by the farmer are denoted p jx and p
j
a,
and are denominated in local currency units. The price p jx takes into account any sector-
specific distortions that increase the intermediate input price, such as transportation costs.
Since I am interested in the decisions of farmers, these are the relevant prices. I construct
this share with data from Prasada Rao (1993), which covers 84 countries in 1985 and is
derived from Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) statistics. Figure 1.1 plots the
intermediate input share in agriculture with log PPP GDP per capita on the horizontal axis,
from the Penn World Tables version 7.0, Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011).
There is a clear positive relationship between income level and the intermediate
share in agriculture, with a correlation of 0.65. Not only is there a positive correlation,
but the level difference between rich and poor countries is large. The lowest intermediate
share in the sample belongs to Uganda, and is one-tenth that of the United States. The
tenth percentile country, as ranked by GDP per capita, has an intermediate input share that
is one-fourth of the intermediate share in the United States.1
1If rich countries are producing different crops than developing countries, one might suspect that the
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Figure 1.1: Intermediate Share in Agriculture
Comparison to Manufacturing and Services
Since this paper is concerned with understanding why agriculture is so much less produc-
tive than nonagriculture, an important question is whether other sectors exhibit the same
relationship between the intermediate share and per capita GDP. I therefore turn to statis-
tics from the United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) to construct intermediate
input shares for (a) “Agriculture, hunting, forestry; fishing,” (b) “Manufacturing,” and (c)
“Education; health and social work; other community, social and personal services.” These
intermediate shares are plotted for in Figure 1.2 for the 49 countries with data available for
all sectors.
Figure 1.2a confirms the relationship between the agricultural intermediate input
share and per capita GDP present in the FAO statistics. Figures 1.2b and 1.2c, however,
show the intermediate input shares in manufacturing and services exhibit no such relation-
ship. This result relates to the results of Hsieh and Klenow (2007). That is, if intermediate
input intensity in manufacturing or services differs across countries, it seems to be driven by
distortions that manifest themselves in higher intermediate input prices. Once these prices
result is driven by different production techniques for these different types of output. While I cannot directly
test this, I do group countries by latitude to control for the type of agricultural production, and compare
within-group variation. The same correlation holds within groups.
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(b) Manufacturing
AUT
BEN
BOL
BWA
BDI
CMR
CAN
CPV
CHL
CHN
COL CYP DENECU
SLV
FJI
FIN
FRA
GMB
DEUGHA
HUN
ISL
ITA
JAM
JPN
JOR KOR
LUXMUS
MEX
NLD
NZL
NGA
NOR
PER
PRT
RWA
SYCSLE
ESPLKA
SWZ
SWE
SYR GBRURY
VEN
ZWE
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
5 6 7 8 9 10
Log GDP per capita (PPP)
(c) Education; health and social
work; other community, social and
personal services
Figure 1.2: Intermediate Shares in Three Sectors
differences are accounted for by denominating intermediate shares in domestic currency,
there is no difference across countries. By contrast, even after accounting for intermedi-
ate price differences across countries, the agricultural intermediate share still exhibits a
positive correlation with income. The distortions driving differences in intermediate share
differences in agriculture are therefore not driven exclusively by cross-country price dif-
ferences. To summarize, Table 1.1 presents the results of a simple linear regression of the
sectoral intermediate share on log PPP GDP per capita.
Only agriculture has a slope significantly different from zero, implying that the
positive relationship between the intermediate input share and per capita income is unique
to the agricultural sector. This result suggests that this positive relationship may be an
important factor for understanding income differences across countries. The rest of this
paper is devoted to developing and quantifying a model to understand the cause of this
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Table 1.1: Relationship between Intermediate Input Share and Log GDP per
Capita (PPP), by Sector
Agriculture Manufacturing Services
Constant −0.43∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.21∗
(0.11) (0.06) (0.11)
Log GDP per capita (PPP) 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.52 0.03 0.03
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels denoted by
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
.
correlation in agriculture and assess its impact on cross-country productivity differences.
1.3 Model
This section lays out a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model in the spirit of Be-
wley (1986) and Aiyagari (1994). The key features are owner-operated farms, incomplete
markets, idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and subsistence requirements.
The model period is a year, and time is discrete and runs t = 0,1,2, . . .. There are
two sectors, sector a for agriculture and sector m for manufacturing, which includes all
nonagriculture. The manufacturing good is the numeraire, so its output price is normalized
to pmt = 1 for all t. Within an economy, decisions are made by a measure one of infinitely
lived villages. While the distinction of a “village” is irrelevant to the theory, it is important
for the quantitative results. Intuitively, this distinction is important because, as pointed out
by Townsend (1994), individuals are relatively well insured against purely idiosyncratic
shocks. Assuming incomplete markets at the individual level would therefore overstate my
results. Covariate risk, such as weather, is more difficult to insure against, implying villages
are the decision making units subject to incomplete markets.
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Technology
The manufacturing output good can be used as either consumption or as intermediate inputs
in agricultural production. Production is characterized by a stand-in firm which uses only
labor services Nmt to produce output according to the constant returns to scale production
function
Ymt = ANmt
where A is a sector neutral TFP parameter. The parameter A is country-specific, and is a
measure of the overall productivity of the economy. The firm maximizes profits at each
date t, so that Nmt is the solution to
max
Nmt≥0
ANmt−wtNmt (1.3.1)
where wt is the wage paid per unit of Nmt . In a competitive equilibrium wt = A for all t.
Turning to agriculture, each village is endowed with one farm that requires interme-
diate inputs x and labor na. Production occurs according to the decreasing returns to scale
production function
yat = ztAx
ψ
t n
η
at
where ψ+η < 1 and A is, again, sector neutral TFP. Land is a fixed factor, and normalized
to one.2 The shock zt is a village-specific productivity shock drawn from a time-invariant
distribution with cumulative distribution function Q(z) and support on [z,z]. The realization
of zt is i.i.d. with respect to both villages and time. I assume the law of large numbers holds,
so that the distribution of shocks across villages is certain.
Intermediate inputs are purchased from the manufacturing sector, at the price px ≥
1. This price is allowed to differ across countries but not time, with the implicit assumption
being that there exists a technology that turns one unit of manufacturing output into 1/px
2See Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2011) for the impact of farm size differences on aggregate productiv-
ity. Adding these differences here would serve only to magnify the quantitative impact, without changing the
theoretical results.
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units of intermediate input. This is a simple way to capture the fact that intermediate inputs
are more expensive in developing countries.
Village Utility and Decisions
A village values consumption from both sectors a and m, and maximizes total expected
village utility given by
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β tu(cat ,cmt)
]
with discount factor β ∈ (0,1). The period t utility flow takes the form
u(cat ,cmt) = α log(cat− a¯)+(1−α) log(cmt)
where c jt is consumption from sector j ∈ {a,m} and a¯ > 0 is subsistence requirement of
the agricultural good. Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2012) find that this utility
function is consistent with the structural transformation path of the U.S..
Villages do not have access to insurance markets, so that the shock can only be
insured against through self-insurance. To this end, villages can save only by storing agri-
cultural output. This storage depreciates at a country-specific rate δ to capture differences
in agricultural storage technologies across countries. This assumption is discussed further
in Section 1.3.
Decision Timing
At time t − 1, the village chooses to save bt units of the agricultural good. A fraction δ
depreciates, and the village enters time t with (1−δ )bt units of savings. The period t deci-
sion problem of a village is broken down into two stages denoted ordering and production,
which are separated by the realization of the idiosyncratic shock z.
In the ordering stage, each village chooses intermediates xt to use in their farm.
After ordering, the shock zt is realized. After the shock, all production and consumption
occurs in the production stage. First, a village chooses how to allocate a village decides
how to allocate labor between the agricultural sector, where they can work on the village
11
farm, and in the manufacturing sector, where they can work for wage wt which is taxed at
rate τ ≥ 0. I assume that tax revenue is rebated as a lump-sum transfer T (b,z). After labor
is decided, all production takes place. There is a centralized market for buying and selling
goods, implying that there is a unique equilibrium price pa. Profits are made, all factors of
production are paid, and consumption and savings choices (cat ,cmt ,bt+1) take place.
The distortion τ is designed to capture the fact that the marginal value of labor is
lower in agriculture than in manufacturing, a fact discussed in Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh
(2011). Tax revenue is rebated lump-sum as to not change the total income available to
the village. This distortion is not required to generate a correlation between A and the
intermediate input share, but still has a major quantitative impact.
Recursive Problem
The timing described above implies that the village state variable is savings bt , and the
aggregate state is the distribution of savings across all villages, denoted µt(b). Since I will
be studying the stationary equilibrium, I suppress the dependence of the decision problem
on the aggregate state µt(b).
At the production stage, once the choice of x is made and z realized, the value of
entering time t with (1−δ )b savings is
V P(x,b,z) = max
ca,cm,na,b′
α log(ca− a¯)+(1−α) log(cm)+βV O(b′) (1.3.2)
subject to constraint set
paca+ cm+ pab′ = pazAxψnηa − pxx+(1− τ)w(1−na)+ pa(1−δ )b+T (b,z)
b′ ≥ 0
ca ≥ a¯, cm ≥ 0
where V O is the value of entering the ordering stage at t + 1 with b′ units of savings in
the stationary equilibrium. The first constraint is the village budget constraint, and the
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second captures the inability to borrow. The harvesting problem in (1.3.2) defines decision
rules ca(x,b,z), cm(x,b,z), na(x,b,z) and b′(x,b,z). Working backwards, the ordering stage
value of entering time t with b savings is
V O(b) = max
x≥0
∫
z
V P(x,b,z)dQ(z). (1.3.3)
This defines the decision rule for intermediate inputs x(b). For future use, aggregate vari-
ables will be denoted by capital letters
Nat =
∫
b
[∫
z
na(b,z)dQ(z)
]
dµt
Xt =
∫
b
x(b)dµt
Yat =
∫
b
[∫
z
zAx(b)ψna(b,z)ηdQ(z)
]
dµt
so that the intermediate input share in agriculture can be written as
X̂t =
pxXt
patYat
. (1.3.4)
Stationary Equilibrium
I will study the stationary competive equilibrium of this economy. This is defined by an
invariant distribution µ = µ∗, a value function V O, decision rules x,na,b′,ca,cm, labor
choice Nm, prices pa and w, and a transfer function T (b,z) such that
1. The value function V O solves the villages’s problem given by (1.3.2) and (1.3.3) with
the associated decision rules
2. Nm solves the sector m firm problem (1.3.1)
3. Markets clear
(a) Manufacturing labor market:
Nm = 1−
∫
z
∫
b
na(b,z)dµdQ(z)
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(b) Agricultural consumption market:∫
b
∫
z
ca(b,z)dQ(z)dµ+δ
∫
b
bdµ =
∫
b
∫
z
zAx(b)ψna(b,z)ηdQ(z)dµ
(c) Manufacturing consumption market:∫
b
∫
z
cm(b,z)dQ(z)dµ+ px
∫
b
x(b)dµ = ANm
4. The state contingent transfer balances for all (b,z)
T (b,z) = τw(1−na(b,z))
5. The law of motion for µ , denoted µ ′(µ), is such that µ ′(µ∗) = µ∗, and µ∗ is consis-
tent with Q(z) and decision rules
Discussion
Before turning to the theoretical and quantitative results, I briefly digress to discuss the
assumptions related to timing of input choices, the shock distribution, and the savings tech-
nology.
Timing
While intermediate inputs are chosen before the realization of the shock, labor is chosen af-
ter. This captures the fact that off-farm labor is an important form of insurance for farmers,
which is discussed in Kochar (1999). Assuming that labor is also chosen before the shock
would amplify the quantitative results, while depriving villages of an empirically relevant
form of insurance. Moreover, it implies a constant labor share across countries, consistent
with the work of Gollin (2002). Note, however, that this timing implies that villages order
intermediate inputs before the shock is realized, and then requires them to take delivery
and pay for the intermediates regardless of the shock realization. This setup allows me to
parsimoniously capture the risky intermediate input decision, while remaining equivalent
to more complicated timing arrangements in which intermediates are produced before they
are purchased.
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Productivity Shocks
There are three main details of the shock distribution that are worth discussing. First, I
assume that the productivity shock is i.i.d. over time. In Bewley models such as this, the
ability to self-insure decreases as the persistence of the shock increases. In this sense, I am
giving the village the best possible chance to self-insure by assuming zt is i.i.d.. The quan-
titative results still suggest that risk is an important margin for understanding intermediate
input choices.
Second, the shock realization is independent of the level of intermediate input us-
age. In particular, using intermediate inputs cannot decrease the variance of shocks. It is
well established that fertilizer does not decrease the variance of farm yields. The classic
reference is Just and Pope (1979), who find that nitrous fertilizers actually increase yield
variance. Traxler et al. (1995) find no effect of fertilizer on yield variance in Mexico. A
component of intermediate inputs that does decrease variance is water used for irrigation.
However, according to statistics from the World Bank Development Indicators, only 3%
of arable cropland in Sub-Saharan Africa is irrigated. If pasture land is included, only
0.4% is irrigated. Uganda for example, irrigates 0.1% of its arable cropland. The poorest
ten percent of countries almost exclusively irrigate less than one percent of arable crop-
land. Because irrigation is used so sparingly, total intermediate inputs should not have a
variance-decreasing effect.
Lastly, the distribution of z must have a lower bound sufficiently far from zero. Oth-
erwise, an equilibrium may not exist, since a village may not be able to satisfy subsistence.
This turns out not be an issue when the model is calibrated.
Savings
I assume that the only savings technology available is costly storage of the agricultural
good, and insurance is not available. The assumption on the lack of insurance markets is
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certainly not controversial in developing countries, and numerous empirical studies have
pointed to this as a key feature limiting fertilizer use, including Karlan et al. (2012) and
Zerfu and Larson (2010). However, there are many ways to save around risk, and self-
insurance has been shown to be effective in limiting the impact of risk in Bewley models.
Here, I discuss a few possibilities for savings, and appeal to a vast empirical literature that
supports my assumption.
One option is savings banks. In addition to paying no interest, Dupas and Robinson
(2011) find that rural savings banks in Kenya actually charge both a start-up fee and a
variable fee for every transaction, making savings accounts an expensive way to save for
the extremely poor. In twelve of thirteen developing countries considered, Banerjee and
Duflo (2007) find that less than 14% of all people living on under $1 a day have savings
accounts. Moreover, saving in cash subjects individuals to depreciation through inflation.
Another option is that villages can simply save in intermediate inputs, and not be
subject to storage depreciation. Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011) point out that re-
selling fertilizer in western Kenya typically involves a twenty percent discount in addition
to the costs of finding a seller. Interestingly, this cost is roughly equal to the calibrated de-
preciation of agricultural storage. Therefore, the addition of this second savings technology
would have no impact on equilibrium outcomes.
A last possibility is savings through capital, which Udry (1996) finds is primarily
accounted for by livestock. Empirical studies in Africa however, including Fafchamps,
Udry, and Czukas (1998) and Kazianga and Udry (2006), have found little response of
livestock sales to negative shocks (e.g. drought). In fact, the latter finds that self-insurance
through grain storage is the key method through which farmers attempt to smooth consump-
tion. During a prolonged drought in Burkina Faso, Reardon, Matlon, and Delgado (1988)
find that although there was little change in livestock holdings, cereal stocks were almost
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completed depleted.3 This leads me to the assumption that self-insurance is available only
through storage of the agricultural output good. However, as pointed out in Kazianga and
Udry (2006), this method of self-insurance still yields little consumption smoothing in the
data. This same outcome is generated by the model developed here, due to the fact that stor-
ing agricultural output is incredibly costly in African countries. Using a new set of storage
depreciation rates, I find that storage losses of twenty percent are common. In Zimbabwe,
for example, almost 30% of maize produced is lost in storage. This is further detailed in
the calibration of Section 1.5.
1.4 Characterization and Analytic Results
This section provides some analytic results to clarify the mechanics of the model. Sec-
tion 1.4 begins by discussing the importance of subsistence requirements in a model with
productivity shocks. Subsistence requirements generate decreasing relative risk aversion,
which has important implications for how villages make risky intermediate input deci-
sions. The implications of this result are discussed in Section 1.4, which shows that TFP
differences generate intermediate share differences if and only if the economy includes
incomplete markets, idiosyncratic shocks, and subsistence requirements.
Subsistence Requirements and Risk
This paper exploits a feature of the utility function that has yet to be explored in a cross-
country framework. Namely, subsistence requirements change the relative risk aversion of
a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function to decreasing relative risk
aversion (DRRA). It is not immediately clear how to define relative risk aversion, however,
because villages value two types of consumption. It turns out that the utility function can
be rewritten as a function of total income, which allows relative risk aversion to be directly
defined over income levels. To see this, first define y as the total income at the production
3On an aggregate level, Lagakos and Waugh (2012) find that capital per worker differences account for
similar percentages of output per worker differences in agriculture and non-agriculture. While capital per
worker differences are important for understanding aggregate output per worker differences, they are not
responsible for the fact that agriculture is significantly less productive than non-agriculture.
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stage, given savings b, intermediate choice x, shock z, and the optimal savings decision rule
b′
y(x,b,z) = pazAxψnηa − pxx+(1− τ)w(1−na)+ pa(1−δ )b+T (b,z)− pab′.
With income y, a village purchases enough agricultural consumption to satisfy subsistence
a¯, then splits the rest of their income between the two sectors based on the relative weights
assigned by the price pa and utility parameter α .
ca(y) = a¯+
α
pa
(y− paa¯),
cm(y) = (1−α)(y− paa¯).
Using these decision rules, the utility flow can be rewritten as a function of total income y,
u˜(y) := u(ca(y),cm(y)) =Ω−α log(pa)+ log(y− paa¯) (1.4.1)
where Ω = α log(α)+ (1−α) log(1−α). Because utility u˜ is only a function of income
y, relative risk aversion with respect to total income y, given a¯ and price pa, can be defined
as
R(y|a¯, pa) = yy− paa¯ .
If a¯= 0, this is a standard log CRRA utility function. However if a¯ > 0, the utility function
instead exhibits decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA), consistent with the household
evidence of Ogaki and Zhang (2001) from India and Pakistan.
With this form of the period utility function, the production stage utility can be
written
V P(x,b,z) =Ω−α log(pa)+ log
(
y(x,b,z)− paa¯
)
+βV O
(
b′(x,b,z)
)
. (1.4.2)
The indirect utility function at the ordering stage is then
V O(b) =Ω−α log(pa)+max
x≥0
∫
z
[
log
(
y(x,b,z)− paa¯
)
+βV O
(
b′(x,b,z)
)]
dQ(z).
(1.4.3)
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Equations (1.4.2) and (1.4.3) illustrate the key tension between expected income and ex-
pected utility. While profits drive production stage utility by increasing y, the ordering
stage choice of x maximizes expected utility, of which income is only one component. The
other is the risk associated with the choice of x. While farm profit increases utility, higher x
implies large exposure to risk. To limit this exposure and decrease the variation in produc-
tion utility, the village must decrease its ex-ante choice of x. Thus, the optimal intermediate
input choice must balance the desire for both high income and low exposure to risk. This
balancing act allows subsistence requirements to play an important role. Since a¯ > 0 im-
plies DRRA, the inclusion of subsistence requirements alters the way farmers undertake
risky investments for different levels of TFP. Section 1.4 shows that this the inclusion of
subsistence requirements interacts with TFP differences and uninsurable shocks to generate
differences in the intermediate share across economies.
Characterizing Intermediate Input Shares
In this section, I show that TFP differences generate differences in intermediate input shares
if and only if the economy includes incomplete markets, idiosyncratic shocks, and subsis-
tence requirements. This qualitatively replicates the positive correlation between interme-
diate input shares and income detailed in Section 1.2. To make these results as sharp as
possible, I consider the static version of the model (identically, δ = 1 for all economies).
Furthermore, because the two exogenous distortions px and τ are not required to gener-
ate this positive correlation between the intermediate input share and productivity A, I fix
τ = 0 and px = 1 in all economies. This leaves sector-neutral TFP A as the only difference
between any two model economies. All proofs are relegated to Appendix C.
The assumed productivity shocks must translate into consumption risk for subsis-
tence requirements to play a role. Therefore, to assess the role of productivity shocks and
incomplete markets, I compare the model developed above (denoted by superscript I for
incomplete markets) with a complete markets version (denoted by superscript C for com-
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plete markets). The complete markets version is identical, except that villages are allowed
to trade a full set of state contingent assets before the realization of z. How this affects in-
termediate input choices can be seen by comparing the first order conditions with respect to
x in the I and C economies. Farmers maximize expected profit with complete markets, be-
cause consumption is fully insured. The ordering stage first order condition in the complete
markets economy is therefore
Ap1/(1−η)a F ′(x)
∫
Z
z1/(1−η)dQ(z) = 1 (1.4.4)
where
F(x) = xψ/(1−η)
(
ηη/(1−η)−η1/(1−η)
)
and F ′(·) is the derivative with respect to x. Without the ability to trade these claims (the I
economy), the first order condition of equation (1.4.3) yields
Ap1/(1−η)a F ′(x)
∫
Z
z1/(1−η)
(
u˜′(y(x,z))
Ez[u˜′(y(x,z))]
)
dQ(z) = 1 (1.4.5)
where u˜ is defined as in equation (1.4.1), and u˜′ is the derivative with respect to income
y. The two first order conditions are exactly the same except for the addition of marginal
utility to the integrand of equation (1.4.5). Instead of just weighting each shock realization
by the probability that it occurs, incomplete markets imply that villages weight by their
risk-neutral probabilities. This captures the fact that villages internalize the impact their
intermediate choice has on consumption in the absence of insurance markets. The addition
of marginal utility to the weight assigned by the village implies that those realizations of z
that imply a higher than average marginal utility are weighted relatively more heavily by
a village that faces uninsurable risk. Similarly, those realizations of z that imply a lower
than average marginal utility are assigned less weight. Thus, the inclusion of incomplete
markets tilts the weight assigned by every village toward “bad” outcomes relative to a
profit-maximizing village. This leads naturally to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. In the competitive equilibrium, the intermediate share is lower in the in-
complete markets economy (I) than the complete markets economy (C) for a given TFP A.
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That is,
X I
pIaY Ia
<
XC
pCaYCa
= ψ
Graphically, this result can be seen in Figure 1.3. In the complete markets economy
(C), the stochastic discount factor is equal to one at every realization of z, and is shown in
Figure 1.3 as the horizontal dotted line at one. In the incomplete markets economy (I) this
changes. Stochastic discounting at low z realizations increases, which can be seen in the
solid line of Figure 1.3.
Proposition 1 only considers the role of incomplete markets within one economy.
The more interesting issue is how the intermediate input share reacts to changes across
economies, because the empirical evidence presented in Section 1.2 suggests a positive
correlation between the intermediate input share and TFP A. First, with a¯ = 0, the interac-
tion of incomplete markets and agricultural productivity shocks is irrelevant in accounting
for the fraction of the labor force in agriculture, the intermediate share, or agricultural
productivity differences.
Proposition 2. In the model with uninsurable shocks (I economy) and a¯ = 0, the following
results hold in the competitive equilibrium:
1. na(z) is independent of A
2. The intermediate share X/(paYa) is independent of A
3. For two economies with TFP levels A1 and A2, agricultural output per worker differ-
ences in the I economy are the same as in the C economy. That is,
Y 1Ca /N
1C
a
Y 2Ca /N2Ca
=
Y 1Ia /N
1I
a
Y 2Ia /N2Ia
While Proposition 1 shows that the equilibrium intermediate input share is lower
with incomplete markets, Proposition 2 shows that when a¯ = 0, it does not differ across
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economies. This is due to the fact that a¯= 0 implies that the period utility function exhibits
CRRA. Intuitively, A can be thought of as a decrease in the mean income realization. With
CRRA, the general equilibrium price of agricultural output increases to incentivize poor
villages to take on more risk. In fact, it exactly offsets the decrease in mean income, and
makes the stochastic discount factor independent of A. This can be seen in the solid line
of Figure 1.3, which shows that stochastic discounting for any realization of z is identical
for all levels of TFP. Moreover, the third result in Proposition 2 shows that, in the absence
of subsistence requirements, the lack of insurance markets plays no role in understanding
labor productivity differences across countries. That is, the predicted agricultural produc-
tivity differences in the model with uninsurable risk and no subsistence requirements are
exactly the same as they would be with complete markets. The inclusion of subsistence re-
quirements breaks this result. When a¯ > 0, the period utility function now exhibits DRRA,
causing the stochastic discount factor to depend on the level of TFP. Proposition 3 shows
that the interaction of productivity shocks and subsistence requirements can qualitatively
replicate the empirical correlation between the intermediate share and TFP from Section
1.2.
Proposition 3. In the competitive equilibrium, the intermediate share is increasing in A if
and only if a¯ > 0.
In an economy with incomplete markets, idiosyncratic shocks, and subsistence re-
quirements, TFP differences are able to generate differences in the intermediate input share
that are qualitatively consistent with the evidence provided in Figure 1.1, while leaving
out any one of these features implies a constant intermediate share across countries. Tech-
nically, this result is driven by the interaction of two features implied by subsistence re-
quirements: DRRA utility and an income elasticity that is less than one with respect to the
agricultural good. The intuition, however, is as follows. Poor farmers have relatively less
income than their rich counterparts for all realizations of z. With subsistence requirements,
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this difference increases as z decreases. Since farmers weigh each realization of z by their
marginal utility at that realization, farmers in poor economies put relatively more weight on
low z than their rich counterparts, as can be seen in Figure 1.3. This causes the intermediate
good share to decrease in economies with low A.4
Figure 1.3: Stochastic Discounting for Different Subsistence Levels
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While Proposition 3 is consistent with the aggregate evidence presented in Section
1.2, the model achieves this result by predicting that villages leave potential profits unreal-
ized due to their own risk aversion. This naturally leads to the obvious concern of empirical
support for this prediction. In fact, there is significant evidence of under-investment (rel-
ative to the profit-maximizing choice) in fertilizer. Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2008),
for example, use a randomized trial in Kenya to show that increases in fertilizer use can
dramatically increase farm yields. Moreover, mounting evidence supports the model’s pre-
diction that this under-investment is driven by the interaction of individual risk aversion and
uninsurable shocks. This evidence is derived from both randomized trials by Karlan et al.
(2012) and panel surveys by Zerfu and Larson (2010). Given that the model is theoretically
consistent with both household and aggregate evidence on intermediate input choices, I
4This result is not generically true in the dynamic model, due to the presence of borrowing constraints.
However, in quantitative simulations, the result holds. Intuitively, when a¯ = 0 the precautionary savings
motive is quite low, in part due to the negative real return of agricultural storage. The stationary equilibrium
therefore has all individuals at zero savings, and is identical to the static equilibrium for which the results are
proved.
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now turn back to the full dynamic model to assess the quantitative impact for cross-country
labor productivity.
1.5 Quantitative Exercise and Calibration
The goal is now to quantitatively assess the importance of agricultural productivity shocks
for cross-country productivity and intermediate input shares. I do so by comparing the
model’s predictions for a rich and poor country. The rich country is designed to capture
the relevant features of the U.S. economy. I normalize A = 1 and calibrate the model with
no distortions (px = 1 and τ = 0) so that the stationary equilibrium matches a number of
features of the U.S. economy, including the intermediate input share in agricultural and the
sectoral composition of employment. The poor economy differs in its level of TFP A, the
depreciation rate of storage δ , the intermediate input price px, and the tax rate τ . These
are all chosen to match the relevant features of the tenth percentile country as ranked by
per capita GDP. To construct the tenth percentile country, I take the average values from
the bottom fifteen to five percent of countries. This averages out some of the variation in
intermediate input shares and intermediate input prices. See Appendix B for more details.
I then proceed to consider two quantitative experiments. The first experiment con-
siders the impact on intermediate input shares and labor productivity. Because the poor
economy differs along a number of dimensions, some differences in labor productivity will
be exogenously fed into the model. Recall, however, that the model with no productivity
shocks generates no differences in intermediate input shares. Therefore, to isolate the im-
pact of intermediate input share differences, I ask how much larger productivity differences
are in the model with shocks, relative to the identical model with no shocks.
The second exercise is to vary the exogenous parameters px, τ , and δ in the poor
model economy while holding all other parameters fixed. The goal of this exercise is
to understand (1) their role in account for intermediate input share differences and (2)
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the complementarity of these different distortions for understanding the results.5 Section
1.5 presents the parameters that are the same across economies. Section 1.5 details the
differences between the two economies in the baseline calibration. Table 1.3 lists all the
parameters chosen.
Common Parameters
The parameters that are the same in both economies are the agricultural production tech-
nology parameters (except for TFP), utility parameters, and the shock distribution. These
are discussed in turn.
The farm production parameters are the shares of intermediates, ψ , and labor, η .
These are chosen to match the aggregate intermediate input share and labor share in agri-
culture in the United States in 1985. The exponent on intermediates, ψ , is set slightly above
0.40 to match an intermediate input share of 0.40 in the rich economy. This is consistent
with the statistics from Prasada Rao (1993) presented in Figure 1.1. Since labor is chosen
after the realization of all uncertainty, the parameter η is exactly equal to the payments
to labor as a share of gross agricultural output. However, this share is difficult to define
in the absence of capital. I therefore choose η = 0.40, which is consistent with the labor
share in Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008). Because estimates of this parameter vary widely,
Appendix A considers the sensitivity of the results to this parameter.
Next I calibrate the utility function parameters. Since the model period is a year,
I set β = 0.96. The remaining parameters are the weight on agricultural consumption, α ,
and subsistence a¯. The parameter α controls the share of agricultural output in GDP in
the long run as TFP approaches infinity. I set α = 0.005, following Restuccia, Yang, and
Zhu (2008) and Lagakos and Waugh (2012). The parameter a¯ is chosen so that the rich
5The goal of this paper is not to explain these distortions but, given that they exist, to understand their
interaction with productivity shocks in the agricultural sector. See Adamopoulos (2011) for the role of the
transportation sector and Estevadeordal and Taylor (2013) for the role of import tariffs in accounting for high
intermediate input prices. Theories of sectoral differences in the marginal value of labor have been proposed
by Caselli and Coleman (2001) and ?, while Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2011) quantitatively investigate
the causes using detailed micro data.
25
economy has an equilibrium agricultural employment share of 2.84%, consistent with the
U.S. in 1985. This implies a¯ = 0.048.
The distribution of shocks to agricultural production is identical in the two economies.
While these distributions may be quite different in reality, the distinction is quantitatively
irrelevant. U.S. villages act similar to profit maximizers because they are so far from sub-
sistence. When A decreases however, villages become much more sensitive to the shape of
this distribution because they are (ex-ante) closer to subsistence. Therefore the distribution
is chosen to match the poor economy, and I make the innocuous assumption that the dis-
tribution is the same in the rich economy. This, of course, requires data from a developing
country.
This is not the only issue confronting the construction of the shock distribution, as
estimating a distribution that is consistent with the model presents a number of other chal-
lenges. First, inputs and outputs in the model are aggregated. Shocks are to “agricultural
production,” for example, not just maize production. Construction of aggregated quantity
indices require both prices and quantities for a variety of inputs and outputs. Second, as
pointed out by Townsend (1994), not all risk is uninsurable. While purely idiosyncratic risk
can be insured relatively well through informal arrangements within villages, covariate risk
that hits entire villages simultaneously is not. The quantitative results will be overstated if
I include insurable output variation as risk.
With these issues in mind, I turn to the International Crops Research Institute for
the Semi-Arid Tropics Village Level Surveys (ICRISAT VLS). This data set contains daily
diaries of plot-level activities, including input and output usage, from ten different Indian
villages. It also contains both quantities and valuations of these goods, so that I can impute
prices and construct the aggregate quantity indices required by the model. Just as impor-
tantly, the notion of a village in the data and a village in my model match. Ogaki and
Zhang (2001) use the same data and reject risk sharing across these villages, suggesting
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that village-level shocks are uninsurable. This data set is therefore able to overcome the
main issues required in constructing the shock distribution.
I provide an overview of the procedure used to construct the shock distribution here,
while a more detailed explanation is given in Appendix D. The data covers three seasons
per village-year. Since the model includes only one production stage per year, the first goal
is to construct village-year-season quantity indices of agricultural output (Y ), agricultural
intermediates (I), nonagricultural intermediates (X), labor (N), and capital (K). I refer to
these as “categories.” While capital is not in the model, I do not want to include variation
in capital and land quality as risk, so I must include it here. The production function from
the model then provides me with residuals, which can be used to construct village-level
shocks.
One minor issue is prices are not directly reported. Instead, they are imputed from
quantities and values. These are only recorded when the input is used or output produced,
so I do not have a complete time series of prices for all inputs and outputs. To combat this,
I first construct the total village-year-season value of each category (I, X , N, K, and Y )
used. This simply requires summing up the value of all goods in each category across all
farms in that village. The next step is to construct the quantity of the aggregated indices,
which requires the construction of a price index and therefore prices. While missing some
prices, every village has at least one (and usually exactly one) good in every category that
is used every period. I choose this good as my numeraire, and use the price time series as
my village-category price deflator. This gives me the needed village-year-season quantity
indices for the required inputs and outputs.
Plugging the quantities into the production function from the model generates Solow
residuals for village i over year-season time periods t
z∗i,t =
Y datai,t − Idatai,t
(Xdatai,t )ψ(N
data
i,t )
η(Kdatai,t )1−ψ−η
.
I assume that these residuals z∗i,t are comprised of exponential time trend, and village and
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seasonal fixed effects, and the random shock z. That is
z∗i,t = vs(1+g)
tzi,t .
To isolate zi,t , I take logs and run the following regression
log(z∗i,t) = log(v)+ log(s)+ t log(1+g).
The error from the regression, εi,t , is equal to log(zi,t). Therefore, zi,t is drawn from a log-
normal distribution, and the shock zi,t = exp(εi,t). The empirical probability distribution
of zi,t is displayed in Figure 1.4. The underlying error term ε has a standard deviation of
σε = 0.59, and a mean of zero. To match in the model, I assume that log(z) is drawn from a
truncated normal distribution with standard deviation 0.59. This distribution is assumed to
have support on [log(0.10), log(4)]. Consistent with the error term from the regression, all
shocks therefore fall in the interval [0.10,4]. The continuous distribution is approximated
by a twenty point discrete distribution.
Figure 1.4: Empirical Distribution of Shocks
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Economy Specific Parameters
The two economies differ along four dimensions: TFP A, the tax rate τ , intermediate input
price px, and lastly the depreciation of stored goods δ ,
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For the U.S. economy, TFP is normalized to A = 1. I discipline the TFP in the
poor country by manufacturing labor productivity. Since manufacturing labor productiv-
ity is equal to A, I set A = 0.25 in the poor economy, which is roughly consistent with
nonagricultural labor productivity differences between the richest and poorest countries.
Since the rich model economy is assumed frictionless, τ = 0 and px = 1. For the
poor model economy, I choose τ = 0.40. This is roughly consistent with differences in the
marginal value of labor across sectors found in Vollrath (2009). The intermediate price in
the poor economy is px = 3. This is taken from from Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008),
who use FAO data to show that there is a strong correlation between per capita income and
intermediate input prices across countries.
Agricultural storage technologies differ between rich and poor countries. For one,
the abundance of silos in developed countries storage provide prima facie evidence of dif-
ference in depreciation rates between rich and poor countries. This depreciation rate plays
an important role in this analysis, since it controls the ability of villages to save their way
away from subsistence. New statistics from the African Post Harvest Loss Information
System (APHLIS) allow me to discipline this storage technology. APHLIS is a network
of local experts that aggregates statistics on weight loss into comparable measures across
African countries and crops. Table 1.2 presents the estimated weight loss data for a number
of crops in a selection of African countries.6
While these weight losses already paint a dire picture of storage in Africa, a distinc-
tion must be made between weight and quality losses. Since the model contains no notion
of quality, the exact empirical counterpart would be depreciation of the value of agricul-
tural output. However, quality losses are notoriously difficult to measure, and certainly do
not change one-to-one with weight losses. With this caveat in mind, I conservatively set
6See Hodges et al. (2010) for a more complete review of APHLIS. Considering more countries only
emphasizes the results. The large weight losses presented in Table 1.2 are present in almost all countries in
the data set.
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Table 1.2: Post Harvest Weight Loss (%) for Selected Countries and Crops for 2007
Maize Wheat Sorghum Millet Rice
Eritrea 17.9 12.9 12.2 10.9 –
Ethiopia 16.4 12.4 12.4 12.1 11.3
Kenya 21.1 12.9 12.7 11.9 13.2
Malawi 19.6 13.4 13.0 12.9 11.6
Mozambique 21.0 – 12.8 12.6 11.4
Rwanda 17.5 14.5 12.5 – 11.3
Sudan 18.0 12.9 12.2 10.7 –
Tanzania 22.0 14.4 12.5 12.3 11.2
Median 19.6 12.9 12.5 12.1 11.4
Note: Data from APHLIS
δ = 0.15 in the poor economy. I set δ = 0.03 in the rich economy. Since the rich model
economy has little need for precautionary savings, changing this value does not influence
the results.
1.6 Quantitative Results
Section 1.6 considers the calibrated model’s ability to predict differences in intermediate
input shares and labor productivity. I find that the model is consistent with the fact that
developing countries have lower intermediate input shares and higher employment in agri-
culture. This generates significantly lower labor productivity in the agricultural sector. In
Section 1.6, I investigate the implications of changing the exogenous distortions px, τ , and
δ .
Impact of Agricultural Risk
The main model results are presented in Table 1.4. Columns two and three, under the
heading Labor Productivity Gap, present the agricultural and aggregate labor productivity
differences between the two economies. These are measured as the rich-to-poor ratio in
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Table 1.3: Parameter Values for Two Economies
Parameter Rich Poor
Specific
A 1.00 0.25
τ 0.00 0.40
px 1.00 3.00
δ 0.03 0.15
Common
ψ 0.40 0.40
η 0.40 0.40
α 0.005 0.005
a¯ 0.048 0.048
z, Q(z) (see Figure 1.4)
agricultural output per worker and GDP per worker. The latter is measured as GDP at the
rich economy model price, since the total labor force is normalized to one. To understand
how these labor productivity gaps are generated, columns four and five are the interme-
diate input shares in both economies, while columns six and seven are the employment
share in agriculture. Table 1.4 shows that the addition of agricultural productivity shocks
to the model generates significant amplification of labor productivity differences. Agricul-
tural productivity differences are amplified 41% from 23.8 to 33.5, or fifteen percentage
points closer to the ratio of 63.7 found in the data. The increase is even larger at the aggre-
gate level, in which the addition of shocks amplifies GDP per worker differences by 75%
from 4.3 to 7.5. This is fourteen percentage points closer to the ratio of 23.1 found in the
data. The model with agricultural productivity shocks gets significantly closer to the data
along both productivity dimensions, implying that agricultural productivity shocks are a
key component of aggregate income differences across countries.
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Table 1.4: Impact of Productivity Shocks on Labor Productivity
Labor Productivity Gap pxX/paYa Na (%)
Economy Agriculture Aggregate Rich Poor Rich Poor
Data 63.7 23.1 0.40 0.09 2.8 82.0
Model with
Shocks 33.5 7.5 0.40 0.22 2.8 56.8
No shocks 23.8 4.3 0.40 0.40 2.8 46.6
The amplification occurs due to a change in input decisions. By virtue of the Cobb-
Douglas production function, the model with no shocks predicts no change in the interme-
diate input share across countries. Once agricultural shocks are included, the intermediate
share prediction for the poor economy decreases from 0.40 to 0.22. This decrease captures
58% of the actual difference between rich and poor countries. The lack of intermediate
inputs used in the poor country forces villages to substitute more labor to reach subsistence
consumption. The prediction of the agricultural labor force increases from 46.6 to 56.8
percent of the population, an increase of 22%. Just as with the intermediate input shares,
the model with shocks is better aligned with the data along this dimension.
Decomposition of Results
This amplification generated by productivity shocks depends on a number of exogenous
distortions in the model, including agriculture-specific distortions px and τ , and the storage
depreciation rate δ . I isolate the impact of each of these by computing a series of counter-
factual poor model economies. Each one assumes that one of these features is equal to the
calibrated U.S. level, instead of the higher level originally calibrated. The results are pre-
sented in Table 1.5. The first two columns are agricultural and aggregate output per worker
in the rich economy relative to the poor economy. The last two columns are the agricul-
tural employment share and intermediate input share in the poor economy (the inputs in the
rich economy obviously do not change). The first row is the calibrated model with all the
differences already discussed. Then I turn off differences in depreciation δ , agricultural
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distortions (px,τ), and then both simultaneously. Lowering the depreciation rate decreases
agricultural productivity differences by 13% and GDP per worker differences by 11%. This
difference, though somewhat small, is driven by the fact that lowering the depreciation rate
allows villages to save away from subsistence. This makes them more willing to take on
risk and use more intermediate inputs, and as such, the intermediate input share increases
by 32%. Lower price distortions work somewhat similarly, though with a much larger mag-
nitude. Agricultural labor productivity decreases by 64% when distortions are lowered to
the U.S. level. This is partially driven by the fact that the intermediate input share increases
by 45%, freeing up labor to move into the manufacturing sector. The intuition is similar to
that of lower depreciation rates. Villages move further from subsistence with lower distor-
tions, and therefore are willing to take on more risk. The last line shows that the impact of
lowering the depreciation rate is muffled in the presence of low agricultural distortions. If
distortions are at the U.S. level already, a change in the depreciation rate lowers agricultural
productivity differences by only 4%, and increases the intermediate input share by only 9%.
As villages move away from subsistence in response to lower distortions, they have little
need for precautionary savings, especially with a negative real return. Although the impact
of agricultural distortions dwarf that of differences in storage depreciation in terms of ac-
counting for agricultural labor productivity, the complimentarity between the two is key for
understanding the full impact of agricultural productivity shocks in developing countries.
Table 1.5: Decomposition of Quantitative Results
Labor Productivity Gap Poor Economy Inputs
Agriculture Aggregate Na (%) pxX/paYa
Baseline 33.5 7.5 56.8 0.22
No cross-country difference in
δ 29.2 6.7 49.8 0.29
(px,τ) 12.2 5.1 20.8 0.32
δ or (px,τ) 11.6 5.1 19.1 0.35
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The Role of Intermediate Input Price
The relatively high price of intermediate inputs in developing countries has been pointed to
as an important factor limiting growth, with implications ranging from agricultural produc-
tivity to trade policy. I further investigate the role played by the intermediate input price for
understanding labor productivity and the intermediate input share in the poor model econ-
omy. Figure 1.5 plots the response of agricultural labor productivity and the intermediate
input share to changes in the intermediate input price for two cases: with shocks (the solid
line) and without shocks (the dotted line).
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Figure 1.5: Poor economy model implications for different px
The first thing to point out is that a higher intermediate input price lowers labor
productivity substantially. As intermediate inputs become more expensive, farmers substi-
tute relatively cheaper labor services. This “substitution effect” lowers labor productivity
regardless of the presence of shocks. The addition of shocks, however, predicts a larger
impact of increasing the price. This is driven by an “income effect” present in this model,
but not in the model without shocks. As intermediate inputs become more expensive, farm-
ers become poorer and less willing to take on risk, and therefore reduce their intermediate
input usage even further beyond what is generated by the substitution effect. This can be
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seen in Figure 1.5b, which shows that the intermediate input share decreases in response to
higher prices. This does not occur in the absence of these shocks, due to the absence of this
income effect. As the intermediate input share gets lower, the predicted decrease in labor
productivity becomes larger.
Through the combined force of these two effects, this model predicts significantly
larger losses in productivity from a change in intermediate input prices. The model pre-
dicts that an increase of the price from one to three decreases labor productivity by about
forty percent without shocks, and by fifty five percent with shocks. Therefore, this model
presents a new margin through which intermediate input prices can affect labor productiv-
ity, and implies that the gains from lowering these distortions are larger than predicted in
models without risk. If the intermediate input share was lowered to U.S. levels, agricul-
tural labor productivity would increase by approximately 120%, and the intermediate input
share would increase by 55% due to the decreased importance of this income effect. The
model without shocks predicts an increase in labor productivity of 71%, and no change in
the intermediate input share.
Changes in Savings Technologies
Table 1.5 shows that the ability to save has a significant impact if it can remove villages
from very close to subsistence, but otherwise seems to have little impact. In this section,
I evaluate this further by comparing agricultural productivity for a variety of depreciation
rates. For a variety of depreciation rates, Figure 1.6 plots the poor economy response of the
intermediate input share and agricultural productivity for two cases: the baseline calibration
of (px,τ) = (3,0.40) (solid line) and the case where (px,τ) = (1,0) (dashed line).
As in Table 1.5, Figure 1.6 shows that lowering the depreciation rate increases pro-
ductivity, but depends on the level of distortions. With no distortions, a decrease in depre-
ciation from δ = 0.15 to δ = 0.03 is required to increase agricultural labor productivity
by 5%. With the calibrated distortions, depreciation only needs to decrease from δ = 0.15
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Figure 1.6: Poor economy model implications for different depreciation rates δ
to δ = 0.13 to generate an identical increase in productivity. This is due to the fact that a
change in depreciation has little impact on input choices once villages are sufficiently far
from subsistence. In fact, in the absence of agricultural distortions, a decrease in depreci-
ation from δ = 0.15 to δ = 0.03 only increases the intermediate input share by 10%. In
the presence of these distortions, a decrease from δ = 0.15 to δ = 0.13 provides a similar
percentage increase, just as was the case for productivity. Therefore, there is scope for δ to
impact productivity, but it depends almost entirely on the economy being extremely poor.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper quantifies the role of idiosyncratic production risk in accounting for sectoral
output per worker differences in a two sector general equilibrium model. In poor countries,
farmers use fewer intermediate inputs, driving down agricultural productivity. The model
captures about sixty percent of the difference in intermediate input shares between the
richest and poorest countries, even though underlying farm technologies are Cobb-Douglas.
Technically, this result is due to the interaction of uninsurable risk with DRRA preferences
generated by subsistence requirements. This has important quantitative implications for
productivity across countries. Relative to an identical model with no productivity shocks,
agricultural productivity differences are amplified by about forty percent, while aggregate
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productivity differences are amplified by seventy five.
The model also provides a new channel through which sector-specific distortions
can impact labor productivity. Since distortions decrease income, farmers become more
risk averse and therefore choose to use even fewer intermediate inputs. Quantitatively, these
distortions are key to understanding the complete impact of agricultural risk. Counterfac-
tual experiments show that lowering these distortions facilitates increased self-insurance
on the part of farmers, decreasing the impact of agricultural risk on intermediate input
shares and productivity. The model predicts that decreasing these distortions to U.S. levels
increases the intermediate input share by 45% in the poorest countries in the world.
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Chapter 2
FACTORS AFFECTING COLLEGE COMPLETION AND STUDENT ABILITY IN
THE U.S. SINCE 1900
2.1 Introduction
The twentieth century saw a dramatic expansion of higher education in the United States.
Among those in the 1900 birth cohort, less than 4% held a bachelor’s or first professional
degree at age 23, but by the 1970 birth cohort this share had risen to more than 30%. Panel
(a) of Figure 2.1 plots this series for all cohorts from 1900 through 1977.1 Concurrent with
the increase in college attendance, the ability gap widened substantially between college
students and those individuals with a high school degree and no college experience, i.e.,
“non-college” individuals. This pattern is seen in Panel (b) of Figure 2.1, which plots the
average IQ percentile (the proxy for “ability”) of college and non-college individuals.2 For
example the average college student born in 1907 had an IQ in the 53rd percentile, very
close to the average non-college individual whose IQ was in the 47th percentile. Yet over
the next several decades, the average IQ percentile increased among college enrollees and
decreased among those with only a high school degree. Most intriguing is that this trend
of increased ability sorting occurred even as the share of students attempting college grew
steadily larger.
The goal of this paper is to understand the causes of these two empirical trends.
However, this task is complicated by the vast number of changes in both the aggregate
economy and education sector over this time period. I combat this by developing an over-
lapping generations lifecycle model populated by high school graduates who are hetero-
geneous in both ability and financial assets. An important feature of the model is that
1The 1977 cohort was 23 years old in 2000 when this data series ends. Data for cohorts born up to 1967
are taken from Snyder (1993), and from 1968 through 1977 are the authors’ calculation.
2These two data trends have also been documented by other authors, including Hendricks and Schoellman
(2012). In panel (b), data points for cohorts prior to 1950 are from Taubman and Wales (1972). The 1960
data point is from the NLSY79, as calculated by Hendricks and Schoellman (2012). The 1980 data point is
my calculation based on data from the NLSY97.
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Figure 2.1: College Completion and Average Student Ability in the U.S. since 1900
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individuals only see a noisy signal of their true ability when making risky decisions about
college enrollment. I incorporate newly constructed data on college costs obtained from
historical printed government sources. Additionally, I estimate life-cycle wage profiles for
men and women in each birth-year cohort in order to accurately model the opportunity
costs of wages foregone by college attendees and the education earnings premia realized
by those who either complete some college or successfully graduate from college.
I calibrate parameters of the model to match the U.S. data and then conduct a series
of experiments in order to understand changes in college completion and ability sorting
over time. First, I find that the secular increase in high school completion is responsible for
less than half of the increase in college completion over the entire time period. The remain-
der is due to changes in college enrollment and completion rates conditional on high school
graduation. Interestingly, however, the key features of the model allowing us to match the
data depend critically on the time period considered. For cohorts born from 1930 to 1950, I
find that changes in college costs are key for generating the increase in college completion,
as they generate a large endogenous increase in college enrollment. Endogenous changes in
the average ability of college students also affects college completion rates, but the impact
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is quantitatively much smaller. For cohorts born after 1950, the benchmark model signifi-
cantly overpredicts college completion rates in the data. I show that this is likely due to a
sharp increase in the growth rate of the college earnings premium. While the college earn-
ings premium was roughly flat for cohorts born between 1900 and 1950, the growth rate
increased sharply for cohorts born after 1950. I find that modifying the model to allow for
imperfect forecasting of the college wage premium improves substantially the predictions
for college completion for cohorts born after 1950, while leaving the results for cohorts
born before 1950 largely unaffected.
In terms of capturing increased ability sorting over time, I consistently find that
changes in economic factors (i.e., earnings premia, college costs, opportunity costs, and
asset endowments) have little impact. Instead, the key feature in the model that accounts
for this is uncertainty about ability. I show that a decrease in the variance of ability signals
can generate an increase in ability sorting similar to that in the data. I attribute this change
to the increases in standardized testing which improved students knowledge of their own
ability relative to other students in their cohort, as discussed in Hoxby (2009).
This paper is related to a large literature on the joint determination of enrollment
changes and ability sorting, but previous work focuses almost exclusively on the post-World
War II period. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011) look at the role of student loan policies
with limited commitment, and shows that this can generate ability sorting. My focus on
an earlier time period excludes the student loan innovations they consider, so I instead
investigate other factors that may be relevant in understanding ability sorting. Garriga
and Keightley (2007) consider the impact of different education subsidies for enrollment
and time-to-degree decisions, in a model with borrowing constraints and risky education
investment. Hendricks and Leukhina (2011) consider the role of borrowing constraints and
learning in understanding the evolution of educational earnings premia. Like this paper,
Altonji (1993) and Manski (1989) assume that high school students do not perfectly know
their own ability, and they use this feature to investigate the role of preferences, ability, and
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earnings premia for enrollment and dropout. Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) extend
the model developed in Willis and Rosen (1979) to include uncertain ability, and find that
roughly sixty percent of the variability in returns to schooling is forecastable.
Hendricks and Schoellman (2012) study the same time period as I do, but they take
data on college completion and student ability as given in order to understand changes in
the college earnings premium in a complete markets model. By contrast, I seek to under-
stand the economic factors that affected college completion and average student ability for
cohorts since 1900. Perhaps most related to this paper is Castro and Coen-Pirani (2012),
who ask whether educational attainment over time can be explained by earnings premia in
a complete markets model. They find that it cannot. My model, with limited borrowing and
uncertainty about ability, matches college attainment well for early cohorts, but shares the
problem that the model overpredicts attainment after 1950 due to the increase in the earn-
ings premia for these cohorts. In both, disgarding individuals’ ability to perfectly forecast
future earnings premia helps the model fit, but not entirely.
My work also relates to a number of empirical papers on the impact of different
economic forces on historical post-secondary completion, including college costs and in-
come by Campbell and Siegel (1967), work on student ability by Taubman and Wales
(1972), academic quality by Kohn, Manski, and Mundel (1976) and borrowing constraints
by Hansen and Weisbrod (1969).
2.2 Model
In this section, I develop an overlapping generations model to investigate the causes of
increased college completion and increased ability sorting.3 The relevant features include
borrowing limits, uncertain ability, and risky completion of college education.
3The counterpart to ability in the data is IQ.
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Demographics and Preferences
Time in the model is discrete, and a model period is one year. Each period, Nmt males and
N f t females are born, each of whom lives for a total of T periods. Let a= 1,2, . . . ,T denote
age. Each individual maximizes expected lifetime consumption
E0
T
∑
a=1
β a−1
(
c1−σa −1
1−σ
)
Endowments and Signals
Individuals are ex-ante heterogeneous along three dimensions: their sex, m or f , initial
asset endowment k0, and ability to complete college, denoted α . The probability that any
individual completes his or her current year of college is given by pi(α), where pi ′ > 0.
Log initial assets, log(k0), and ability α are drawn from a joint normal distribution with
correlation ρt , means µα,t and µk,t , and standard deviations σα,t and σk,t . Note that the
parameters on the joint distribution for {α,k0} are potentially time-varying.
While sex and asset endowments are perfectly observable, ability α is not. Instead,
each individual receives a signal θ = α+ ε at the beginning of life. The error term is ε ∼
N(0,σ2ε ). Note that because assets and ability are jointly distributed, individuals actually
receive two pieces of information about ability – the signal θ and asset endowment k0. Let
ν = (k0,θ) be the information an individual has about his true ability. After the initial
college enrollment decision, ability α becomes publicly observable.
Education Decisions
The population I am considering consists of high school graduates, so that birth in this
model translates to a high school graduation in the real world. At birth, every individual
decides whether or not to enroll in college, given sex, asset endowment k0, and signal θ .
This is the only time this decision can be made. Once enrolled in college, individuals
can only exit college by graduating or failing out with annual probability pi(α). After
failure, individuals enter the labor force and may not re-enroll, consistent with the finality
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of dropout decisions discussed in Card and Lemieux (2001). Graduating college requires
C years of full-time education at a cost of λt per year. If an individual decides to not enter
college, he or she immediately enters the labor market and begins to work.
Labor Market
I adopt the common assumption that individuals of different ages, a, sex s, and education,
e, are different inputs into a constant returns to scale production function that requires
only labor. Therefore, wages depend on age, sex, education level, and the year. I write
wages as wa,t(e,s) for s ∈ { f ,m} and e ∈ {0,1, . . . ,C}. While ability α has no direct effect
on realized wages, it does affect expected wages because higher ability students are more
likely to graduate college and earn higher wages.
Savings Market
Each individual can borrow and save at an exogenous interest rate rt . I assume individuals
must die with zeros assets, so kT+1 = 0. Borrowing is constrained to be a fraction γ ∈ [0,1]
of expected discounted future earnings. Therefore, individuals must keep assets kt each
period above some threshold k¯, where
k¯ =−γ ·E
n=T
∑
n=a
wn,t
1+ rt
Note that both the expectations operator and wage can depend on a number of factors, in-
cluding ability α , age a, year t, education e, and sex s. Therefore, the borrowing constraint
will be written as the function k¯(α,a, t,e,s). In a slight abuse of notation, I will write
k¯(a, t,e,s) when the borrowing constraint does not depend on ability α , as is the case once
an individual finishes college.
Timing and Recursive Problem
At the beginning of year t, Nmt men and N f t women are born at age a = 1. Again, each
individual is initially endowed with assets k0, sex s, ability α , and a signal θ of true ability.
Immediately, each individual decides whether or not to enroll in college. If he or she enrolls
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in college, true ability is immediately realized, and the individual proceeds through college.
In the case of failure (due to pi(α)) or graduation, he or she proceeds to the labor market
and works for the remainder of his or her life. Individuals who do not enroll in college
proceed directly to the labor market, where they receive the wage associated with age a,
education e = 0, and sex s.
Recursive Problem for Worker
For individuals currently not enrolled in college, their ability is irrelevant for their decision
problem. Therefore, the value of entering year t at age a with assets k, years of college
education e, and sex s ∈ { f ,m} is:
V wa,t(k,e,s) = u(c)+βV
w
a+1,t+1(k
′,e,s)
s.t. c+ k′ = (1+ r)k+wa,t(e,s)
k′ ≥ k¯(a, t,e,s)
kT+1 = 0
Recursive Problem for College Student
If instead an individual is currently enrolled in college, he has already completed e years
of his education and must pay λt in college costs for the current year. The probability that
he passes and remains enrolled the next year, however, depends on his ability α . Recall
that α is known with certainty as soon as the education decision is made, so there is no
uncertainty about ability.
The value of being enrolled in college at year t at age a, with assets k, ability α , e
years of education completed, and sex s ∈ { f ,m} is:
V ca,t(k,α,e,s) = u(c)+β
[
pi(α)V ca+1,t+1(k
′,α,e+1,s)+(1−pi(α))V wa+1,t+1(k′,α,e,s)
]
s.t. c+ k′−λt = (1+ r)k
k′ ≥ k¯(α,a, t,e,s)
pi(α) = 0 i f a =C ∀α
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The last restriction simply states that if a = C, that individual is graduating college and
cannot acquire any more years of college education.
The College Enrollment Decision
Given the value of being enrolled in college and working, it is possible then to define the
educational decision rule at the beginning of life. Recall that at this point, α is unknown,
but each individual receives a signal ν = (k0,θ). Each individual then constructs beliefs
over possible ability levels by using Bayes’ Rule.
Let F(α;k0,θ) be the cumulative distribution function of beliefs (as defined by
Bayes’ Rule) over ability levels. Given all this, an individual born in year t of sex s with
assets k0 and signal θ enters college if and only if the expected value of entering college is
higher than the (certain) value of entering the workforce. This is given by the inequality
∫
α
V c1,t(k0,α,1,s)F(dα;k0,θ)≥V w1,t(k0,0,s) (2.2.1)
2.3 Calibration
The goal of this paper is to assess the role played by a number of features of the economy
in understanding ability sorting and college enrollment over time. I therefore take a multi-
faceted approach to parameterizing the model. First, I construct historical data series for
Nmt , N f t , and λt , which are incorporated directly into the model. Second, I estimate life-
cycle wage profiles wa,t(e,s), which are taken as given by model individuals solving their
dynamic problem. Third, I exogenously choose values for T , C, rt , β , ρt , µα,t , µk,t , σα,t ,
σk,t , and pi(α). Finally, I calibrate σε,t , and γ in order to match important features of the
time series data. Each of these are discussed in more detail below.
Historical Time Series Data
As previously mentioned, Nmt males and N f t females are “born” into the model each year,
meaning they graduate high school and enter the model eligible to make college enrollment
decisions. I take high school completion, and thus the population of potential college en-
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rollees, as exogenous. The series for Nmt and N f t are taken directly from the U.S. Statistical
Abstract Historical Statistics, and I use linear interpolation to supply missing values.
Annual college costs per student, λt , are calculated as the average tuition and fee
expenses paid out-of-pocket by students each year.4 Note that because I measure average
out-of-pocket costs in the data, λt accounts for changes over time in the average amount
of financial aid received by students in the form of public and private scholarships and
grants. Full details of the data construction are relegated to Appendix E. Briefly, however,
I compute λt each period as the total revenues from student tuition and fees received by all
institutions of higher education divided by the total number of students enrolled in those in-
stitutions. The complete time series is constructed by splicing together data from historical
print sources including the Biennial Surveys of Education (1900 to 1958) and the Digests
of Education Statistics (since 1962).
Life-Cycle Wage Profiles
Life-cycle wage profiles wa,t(e,s) are estimated using decennial U.S. Census data from
1940 through 2000, along with American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2006-2010.
Each ACS data set is a 1% sample of the U.S. population, so that when combined they con-
stitute a 5% of the U.S. population, similar to a decennial census. The data are collected
from the Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), Ruggles et al. (2010), and in-
clude wage and salary income, educational attainment, age, and sex. From age and educa-
tion data I compute potential labor market experience, x, as age minus years of education
minus six. I assume that wages can be drawn from one of three education categories - high
school, some college, or college. These correspond to e = 0, e ∈ [1,C−1] and e =C in the
model. For each education category, I estimate wage profiles for the non-institutionalized
population between ages 17 and 65 who report being in the labor force using the following
4Additional student expenses, such as room and board, could also be included, and in fact I do consider
these costs as a robustness exercise in Section 2.5. I choose to leave these out of the benchmark specification
because such costs are usually more accurately classified as consumption rather than education expenses, and
must be paid regardless of college enrollment status.
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regression:
log(wi,t) = δ bi,t +
4
∑
j=1
β sj x
j
i,t (2.3.1)
where i denotes individuals, b is birth-year cohort, s is sex, and x is potential labor market
experience. In words, I regress log wages on a full set of birth year dummies plus sex
specific quartics in experience.
Exogenous Parameters
Parameters set exogenously prior to solving the model are: T , C, rt , β , ρt , µα,t , µk,t ,
σα,t , σk,t , and pi(α). I set the length of working life at T = 48, implying that individuals
born into the model at age 18 would retire at age 65. The number of periods required
to complete college is C = 4, so that all individuals in the model have post-secondary
education e ∈ {0,1,2,3,4}.5 The real interest rate is set to rt = 0.04 in all periods, and the
discount rate is β = 0.96, a standard value in models with annual periods.
I now turn to the parameters for the joint normal distribution over {α,k}. Recall
from Section 2.2 that α only affects an individual’s probability of passing college. Further-
more, my interest in “ability” is limited to understanding changes over time in the average
ability of college versus non-college students within cohorts. In other words, I only care
here about the relative ability of students within the same birth year, as in the data from
Figure 2.1b, not across birth years. As this is the objective, I do not have to worry about
trends in average student ability (such as the so-called “Flynn effect”) and can normalize
the ability distribution for each birth cohort. For this reason, I set µα,t = 0 and σα,t = 1,
for all t, so the distribution for α is a standard normal, conditional on k0.
Unlike with ability, I am certainly concerned about changes over time in the mean
and variance of the initial asset distribution. I interpret k0 as a reduced-form way of captur-
ing all of the personal financial resources available to a new high school graduate, including
but not limited to parental gifts and bequests, and the individual’s own income and savings.
5I am not presently concerned with educational attainment beyond the bachelor’s degree level, so I do
not model post-graduate education in this paper.
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Additionally, since the model does not allow for individuals to work while in college, I
interpret initial assets to also include the present value of income earned while enrolled.
With this in mind, I require that the mean and standard deviation of initial assets in the
model to track the mean and standard deviation of income in U.S. data. To this end, I start
with µk,t equal to the annual mean real income per person, as in Piketty and Saez (2006) so
that the average real asset endowment in the model equals the actual real mean income in
the U.S. each year. Then, in order to account for the fact that µk,t includes the individuals’
own earnings while in college, I adjust it upward for men and downward for women so that
the difference between mean asset endowments for men and women matches the gender
earnings gap in the estimated wage profiles during college years.
Piketty and Saez (2006) also provide historical data on the share of income received
by the top ten percent of individuals, as well as the cut-off income level for the 90th per-
centile. Assuming that the U.S. income distribution is log-normal as predicted by Gibrat’s
law, I can use these data to back out the implied standard deviation of the U.S. income
distribution each year. The procedure is as follows. Let real income in year t, denoted Yt ,
be a random variable with realization yt such that Yt ∼ lnN (µt , σ2t ) and the associated
cumulative distribution function is FY (yt ;µt ,σ2t ). Observed data are the real mean income
in the U.S. in year t, denoted yt , and the 90th percentile of real income in year t, denoted
y90,t . A standard property of the log-normal distribution is that E[Yt ] = exp(µt + σ
2
t
2 ). Since
E[Yt ] = yt is observed, I can guess a value σ˜2t and solve for the associated mean of the
distribution:
µ˜ = ln(yt)−
σ˜2t
2
Next, I compute 1−FY (y90,t ; µ˜, σ˜2t ), which would be the fraction of total income received
by those with income above the threshold value y90,t if the mean and variance of the income
distribution were actually µ˜ and σ˜2t . This process continues iteratively until I find a value
σ2t , and associated µt such that the fraction of income received by the top ten percent equals
that observed in the data. I then set σk,t = σt .
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The last parameter related to the stochastic endowment process that I need to deter-
mine is ρt , the correlation between ability and initial asset endowments. Lacking the rich
historical data that would be required to properly identify this parameter, I will assume for
the benchmark parameterization that ρt = 0 for all t, so that ability and assets are inde-
pendent random variables. Intuitively, though, one would expect some positive correlation
between a student’s financial resources and his or her probability of completing college.
It is well known, for example, that parental income is positively related with student test
scores and performance. This is discussed in Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005) and
Cameron and Heckman (1998). Moreover, this correlation also implies a more precise sig-
nal of ability. Thus, I later examine in Section 2.5 how the results may change as I allow ρ
to increase.
Finally, I need to set the annual probability of passing college, pi(α). Note that pi(α)
is a reduced form way to capture college non-completion for any reason, including failure
and voluntary drop-out. I employ the simple assumption that an individual’s cumulative
probability of completing college equals her percentile rank in the ability distribution. For
example, an individual whose ability is higher than 75% of the peers in her birth-year
cohort will complete college with probability 0.75, conditional on enrollment. With the
length of college set to C = 4, there are 3 independent opportunities for failure - after the
first, second, and third years of school. Thus, the annual probability pi(α) is simply the
cumulative probability raised to the power one-third.
Calibrated Parameters
Finally, I choose the borrowing constraint, γ , and the variance of the noise on the ability
signal, σε,t , to replicate the two main data series of interest – college completion and the
average ability of college relative to non-college individuals. The borrowing constraint is
set to γ = 0.025 in order to match the time series of college completion. Intuitively, this
means that in any given period an individual can borrow up to 2.5% of his expected lifetime
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income. Post-schooling, this amount is known with certainty because the wage profiles are
given, but during college the expected lifetime income is conditional on the probability of
passing college.
Unfortunately, I do not have direct evidence on the precision with which individu-
als in a given cohort know their own ability relative to their peers. At a qualitative level,
it is likely that this precision has increased – i.e., σε,t has likely decreased – over time.
In the early part of the 20th century, no standardized exams existed to compare students
within cohorts across schools. Those college admissions exams that did exist were gen-
erally school-specific, so there was little scope for comparison of students across schools.
During World War I, the U.S. military began testing recruits using the Army Alpha and
Army Beta aptitude tests. By World War II, these tests were replaced by the Army General
Classification Test (AGCT), a precursor to the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).
On the civilian side, the introduction of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) in 1926 started
a trend toward more widespread use of standardized exams as a college admissions criteria.
As standardized testing became more common, students obtained more and more precise
signals of their own ability relative to peers. In the modern era, virtually every student con-
templating college takes either (or both) of the SAT or the ACT (American College Testing)
exams. Even those who do not take these college admissions exams still have quite precise
information about their relative ability because other standardized exams are mandated at
public schools.
With this historical background in mind, I make the following assumptions on the
time series structure of σε,t . For cohorts making college decisions prior to World War II,
i.e., those born 1900 through 1923 and graduating high school from 1918 through 1941, I
assume that σε,t decreases linearly from σε,1900 = 2 to σε,1923 = 0.2. For cohorts born after
1923, σε,t remains constant at 0.2. This is an admittedly ad hoc construction, but in a simple
way it captures the trend of each subsequent cohort getting slightly better information than
the previous cohort as aptitude and ability tests became more common in the time between
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the world wars. By the completion of World War II, such tests were in widespread use and
students likely had quite precise signals about their own ability relative to peers.
2.4 Results
The main computational exercise consists of first simulating the model for U.S. birth co-
horts from 1900 through 1972 (i.e., students who graduated high school from 1918 through
1990), verifying that the model replicates important features of the historical data, and
then running counterfactual simulations to quantify the impact of changes in direct college
costs, education earnings premia, and opportunity costs of college (foregone wages) on
college completion and average student ability. Having discussed the benchmark model
parameterization, I now examine how well the simulated model matches U.S. data.
Benchmark Model Fit
Figure 2.2 depicts the model predictions along with historical U.S. data for college com-
pletion and average student ability. The measure of college completion that I choose to
match is the share of 23-year-olds with a college degree. While educational attainment is
often measured later in life to capture those who complete college at older ages, I prefer
this series for a couple of reasons. First, to my knowledge it is the only measure of college
completion with consistent time series data for birth cohorts back to 1900. Second, the
model is not constructed to evaluate college enrollment decisions of older students who: (i)
are generally less financially-dependent upon parents when paying for education; (ii) face
different opportunity costs of school after having been in the workforce for some time; and
(iii) may anticipate different return on investment in education due to later-life completion.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.2 shows that, overall, the model replicates well the trends in
U.S. college completion over much of the 20th century, with one notable exception. The
model does not capture the initial decline and subsequent increase in college completion
for cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s. This deviation is due primarily to the modeling
assumption that individuals know their lifetime wage profile with certainty, implying that
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Figure 2.2: Benchmark Model Results
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they can perfectly forecast changes in the education earnings premium. Later I consider
alternative assumptions, and find that the model can generate more accurate predictions
over this time period.
Panel (b) of Figure 2.2 plots the average ability percentile of students who attempt
college (even if they do not complete), and those who have only high school education.
While I only have a few reliable data points to match, those I do have show a clear pattern
of increased sorting by ability over time. For cohorts born at the beginning of the 20th
century, college and non-college students had similar ability on average, but the ability gap
widened throughout the century. This general pattern is also predicted by the model.
In order to facilitate quantitative comparison with alternative specifications, I also
provide measures of model fit over various time periods in Table 2.1. The measure of fit
I report is the sum of squared deviations between model and data. The columns labeled
“Fraction of 23-year-olds with college degree” refer to the series in Panel (a) of Figure
2.2. For this series, I compute the fit over all cohorts 1900-1972, and three subsamples:
1900-1925, 1926-1950, and 1951-1972. As seen in the “Benchmark” model specification
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in Panel (a) of Figure 2.2, the model matches the data very closely for cohorts born pre-
1950, but does less well for cohorts born after 1950. The column labeled “average ability
difference” measures how well the model matches the difference between the average abil-
ity percentile of college and non-college individuals. I only report the full sample for this
statistic because there are so few data points to match within the sub-sample periods.
Discussion of Benchmark Results
The measure of college completion – the fraction of twenty-three year olds with a college
degree – can be decomposed as
Pgrad
P23
=
(
PHS
P23
)(
Penroll
PHS
)(
Pgrad
Penroll
)
(2.4.1)
where PHS, Penroll , and Pgrad are the number of people that complete high school, enroll
in college, and graduate college. The model’s predictions for college completion can be
decomposed into the three terms on the right hand side of equation (2.4.1). While the first
is exogenous, the second and third terms are endogenous to the model. In this section, I use
this decomposition to understand what drives the change in college completion predicted
by the model.
Figure 2.3: College Enrollment Conditional on High School Graduation
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Figure 2.4: College Pass Rate
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First, Figure 2.3 plots the share of high school graduates that enroll in college, as
predicted by the model. In the language of equation (2.4.1), this is Penroll/PHS. Figure 2.3
shows that for cohorts born between 1900 and 1920, college enrollment rates conditional
on high school graduation were between 30 and 50 percent, albeit with a lot of noise. This
rate increased for cohorts born in the 1920s and generally remained between 50 and 60
percent for cohorts through 1950, after which the rate again increased substantially.
The third term in equation (2.4.1) is the share of college enrollees that graduate
by age twenty-three. This is given by the ratio Pgrad/Penroll and is plotted in Figure 2.4.
While Figure 2.4 shows that the college pass rate has a fair amount of year-to-year noise, the
hump-shaped trend is still evident. From the 1900 through 1930 birth cohorts, the college
pass rate increased from about 51% to nearly 61%. After the 1930 cohort, however, this
trend reverses, and the pass rate steadily declines back down to around 53%. This result
is consistent with evidence from Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner (2010), who compare the
high school class of 1972 (roughly birth cohort 1954) to that of 1992 (birth cohort 1974) and
find a significant decrease in college completion conditional on enrollment. In my model,
this pattern is due entirely to the ability composition of college students. Recall from
Panel (b) of Figure 2.2 that the average ability of college enrollees was generally increasing
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through the 1930 cohort, then decreasing in the following cohorts. Unfortunately, I have
found no reliable historical data to compare with the model’s predicted pass rates. However,
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) does provide more recent data I can
use for a rough comparison. For the cohort beginning college in 1996 (assuming they are
around 18 years old on average, this would be approximately the 1976 birth cohort), the
share completing college within five years was 50.2%.6 The last birth cohort in the model
is 1972, so the comparison is not perfect, but the model pass rate of 53.1% for that cohort
is quite close.
I now isolate the effects of the college enrollment and college pass rates through
two counterfactual experiments. I ask two questions. First, how does college completion
change relative to the benchmark if there were no endogenous increase in the college en-
rollment rate, as in Figure 2.3? Second, how does college completion change if there were
no endogenous changes in the college pass rate, as in Figure 2.4? Results from these two
experiments are plotted in Figure 2.5, along with the benchmark prediction for college
completion.
Figure 2.5: College Completion if Enrollment Rates and Pass Rates were Constant
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Figure 2.5 shows that if the college enrollment rate had remained constant instead
6See Table 341 in the 2010 Digest of Education Statistics.
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of rising after the 1920 cohort, the model would have under-predicted college completion
rates by more than half by the end of the time series.7 Similarly, if the college pass rate had
instead remained constant at the 1900 value of 51.5%, then college completion would have
been several percentage points lower than in the benchmark model. It is clear, however,
that the quantitative effects of changes in college enrollment are much larger than those
due to changing college completion rates.
Counterfactual Experiments
What if individuals do not have perfect foresight of education earnings premia?
Figure 2.6 shows that for cohorts born in the U.S. prior to 1950, the education premia
implied by the estimated life-cycle wage profiles exhibit some year to year variation, but
essentially no trend. Beginning around the 1950 cohort, however, the college earnings
premia began increasing steadily. I now examine how the model predictions for college
completion and average student ability would differ if, instead of predicting changes in
the education premium exactly, model individuals expected an historical average education
earnings premia to prevail in the future as well.
For this exercise, I assume that the high school wage for each cohort is observable,
but the earnings premia for individuals who complete college or some college are not ob-
servable. Rather, individuals observe a moving average of the earnings premia earned by
previous cohorts and assume their own cohort’s earnings premia will be the same. Thus,
as the true college earnings premium begins rising, newly born cohorts will predict the
increase imperfectly and with several years lag.
Figure 2.7 shows the model predictions under this counterfactual experiment, as-
suming a 25-year moving average. Relative to the benchmark model results, notice that the
model now comes much closer to the actual college completion rate in the data for cohorts
born after 1950. The model still does not capture all of the decline for the cohorts in the
7In Figure 2.5, I assume that the the college enrollment rate conditional on high school graduation is
constant at 36.9%, which is the average enrollment rate for cohorts 1900 through 1920.
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Figure 2.6: Education Premia Implied by Estimated Life-Cycle Wage Profiles
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Figure 2.7: Results with Imperfect Foresight of Education Earnings Premia
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1950s, but as Table 2.1 clearly shows, this specification fits the data much better than the
benchmark assumption that individuals perfectly forecast changes in the education premia.
Over the entire time period, the sum of squared deviations declines by almost two-thirds
from the benchmark value of 0.158 to 0.055. All of this gain is due to the 1951-1972
cohorts, where the sum of squared deviations changes from 0.133 to 0.022, a decrease
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of more than 83%. Additionally, the model’s ability to match changes in average ability
of college and non-college students also improves under this specification. According to
the last column of Table 2.1, the sum of squared deviations declines from 0.034 to 0.028.
These improvements strongly suggest that perfect foresight of education earnings premia
is a problematic assumption. Accurately modeling students’ expectations about the returns
to education is crucial for understanding college enrollment decisions, particularly during
periods of time when education premia are changing rapidly.
What if real college costs increased proportional to real disposable incomes?
I now ask how college completion rates and average student ability would have differed
over the time period in question if real college costs were constant with respect to real
average income. Figure 2.8 depicts the actual time series data for real college costs that I
use in the benchmark model (solid line), along with a hypothetical series for college costs
which are a constant fraction of annual real average income (dashed line). From 1920
to around 1940, the actual series exceeds the hypothetical series due the the fact that per
student tuition and fees spiked relative to income during the Great Depression. Then from
the early 1940s until about 1990, the hypothetical series is above the actual series. Holding
all else constant, I would expect that individuals in the counterfactual model facing the
hypothetical college costs should attend college in greater numbers for the cohorts born
from about 1900 to 1920 (those in school from around 1920 to 1940), and fewer of those
born after 1920 would attend college.
Figure 2.9 largely confirms these predictions. Relative to the data, the model pre-
dicts too many people attending college for those cohorts born between about 1910 and
1925. For the cohorts from 1925 through 1950, the model does predict slightly fewer col-
lege graduates, but still matches the data quite closely. And finally, for the cohorts born
after 1950, the model still predicts more college graduates than in the data. However, as
can be seen in Table 2.1, the model fit improves over this period since the sum of squared
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Figure 2.8: College Costs
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deviations fall from 0.133 to 0.099, a decrease of more than 25%. Turning to Panel (b)
of Figure 2.9, there are hardly any discernible differences in average ability of college and
non-college students relative to the benchmark model. This can also be confirmed by noting
that sum of squared deviations for the average ability difference in Table 2.1 is unchanged
from the benchmark value of 0.034. I conclude that the fluctuations in real college costs
relative to real income are not a major factor in accounting for the increased ability sorting
over time.
2.5 Robustness
Having discussed the benchmark model results and counterfactual experiments, I now make
a few remarks about the robustness of some modeling assumptions. In particular, I made
the strong assumption that ability and initial assets were uncorrelated. I also assumed that
room and board were excluded from college costs. I now relax these assumptions and see
how they affect the results.
Correlation of Ability and Initial Assets
In the benchmark specification, I assumed that the random endowments for ability and as-
sets were uncorrelated. However, there is evidence to suggest that these may be positively
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Figure 2.9: Results with Alternative College Costs
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correlated, and I want to understand how this affects the results. I maintain the assumption
that α and log(k0) share a bivariate normal distribution, only now I set ρ = 0.3. All other
parameters are maintained as in the benchmark specification. Figure 2.10 shows the model
predictions for college completion and ability sorting between college and non-college in-
dividuals.
Figure 2.10: Results with Positive Correlation between Ability and Initial Assets
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Relative to the benchmark model results, two things are notable. The positive cor-
relation between ability and assets increases college completion minimally throughout the
time period, and it increases the difference in ability between college and non-college stu-
dents during earliest birth cohorts. Both of these effects reduce the model fit slightly, as
seen in Table 2.1. The increase in completion is simply due to the fact that higher ability
students are now more likely to have greater financial resources as well, thus making them
more likely to attend college. The effect on average ability is also quite intuitive. Recall
that individuals receive information ν = (k0,θ), where θ = α+ε is the noisy signal of true
ability α . As ρ increases k0 becomes more informative about α , so individuals with high
initial assets will infer that they have higher ability, and thus be more likely to enroll in
college. This increases the average ability of individuals who attempt college, while simul-
taneously decreasing the average ability of non-college individuals. The effect is largest for
earlier birth cohorts because later birth cohorts received more accurate signals about their
true ability.
College Costs Including Room and Board
College costs in the benchmark model were restricted only to tuition and fees. Now, I take
a broader view of college costs and examine whether or not the results are sensitive to the
inclusion of room and board expenses. Like the earlier time series data on college tuition
and fees, I construct this data from printed historical government documents. The details
are found in Appendix E. For this experiment, all calibrated values are maintained just as in
the benchmark economy, with the exception of the borrowing constraint, γ . I need to adjust
γ because students now face additional college expenses, so college completion rates would
be too low if I held γ constant at the benchmark value. The new borrowing constraint which
allows us to match the time series of college completion is γ = 0.04.
Figure 2.11 shows the model predictions for college completion and average student
ability when room and board costs are included. Relative to the benchmark results in
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Figure 2.11: Results for College Costs including Tuition, Fees, Room, and Board
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Figure 2.2, very little has changed. The model still predicts college completion rates in
line with the data up until the 1950s and 1960s cohorts, when model and data diverge.
Additionally, average ability of college and non-college students diverges over time just as
in the benchmark model. Referring to Table 2.1, it is clear that while the model fits college
completion slightly worse than the benchmark model pre-1950, it does slightly better post-
1950. On the whole, this model fits almost exactly as well as the benchmark model for both
college completion and average ability difference.
2.6 Conclusion
I develop an overlapping generations model with unobservable ability and borrowing con-
straints to investigate post-secondary completion and ability sorting in the birth cohorts of
1900–1972. To discipline the model, I digitize and utilize historical data series including
statistics on college costs and high school graduation rates. I find that the share of high
school graduates enrolling in college and the subsequent college pass rate are both key for
understanding increased college graduation rates. However, I find no evidence that eco-
nomic factors – including real college costs, opportunity costs, education wage premia, or
asset endowments – have a major impact on increasing ability sorting over time. I do find,
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however, that a decrease in the variance of ability signals can properly match this fact, a
trend which I attribute to increases over time in standardized testing.
An important deviation between the benchmark model and historical data is that
the model does not properly match college completion after the 1950 birth cohort. I show
that this could be due to individuals having imperfect foresight about the college earnings
premium. If individuals observe a moving average of the earnings premia from previous
cohorts and use this to estimate the future earnings premium, then changes in the earnings
premium are taken into account only with a lag. I build this into the model and find that
it significantly improves the model’s fit. I therefore view this as evidence of backward
looking wage estimation when making college enrollment decisions.
An interesting use of this framework would be an extension to multiple countries.
Evidence by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) suggests that ability is strongly related to growth,
but Bils and Klenow (2000) find that the causality from formal schooling to economic
growth is somewhat tenuous. If developing countries have very little ability sorting between
education levels, as was the case in the early U.S., there may be a weak correlation between
education level and labor efficiency. In a cross-country context, this could arise due to
tighter borrowing constraints or less precise signals about true ability. I will explore this
link in future research.
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Chapter 3
NEED-BASED ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY
ACROSS COUNTRIES
3.1 Introduction
While income per capita differences across countries are large, human and physical capital
can account for only a small share of these income differences. Instead, Hall and Jones
(1999) and Klenow and Rodrguez-Clare (1997) find that income differences are primarily
accounted for by TFP.
One possible source of these TFP differences is that a large share of business owners
in developing countries operate firms not due to sufficient entrepreneurial ability or wealth,
but because they have no other employment opportunities. In fact, while over ninety per-
cent of business owners in the United States claim they are taking advantage of a business
opportunity, only sixty percent of business owners in places like Brazil, India, Peru, and
China claim the same. The other forty percent of business owners in these countries op-
erate businesses explicitly because they have no other employment opportunities.1 I refer
to these individuals as need-based entrepreneurs. Put somewhat differently, need-based
entrepreneurs would be willing to accept a job offer but simply to not have access to one,
which suggests a significant amount of occupational misallocation between entrepreneur-
ship and employment in developing countries. Motivated by this evidence, the goal of
this paper is to provide a theory to help rationalize cross-country differences in need-based
entrepreneurship, and in turn, quantitatively assess its role for TFP differences across coun-
tries.
To do so, I develop a general equilibrium model that embeds a a costly search frame-
work into a Bewley (1986)-Aiyagari (1994) incomplete markets model, further extended
to include entrepreneurship and collateral constraints. The basic idea put forth here is that
1These statistics are derived from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Surveys, and are detailed further
in Section 3.2.
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unemployed individuals in developing countries turn to entrepreneurship as a replacement
for the lack of government-provided unemployment benefits. Without unemployment in-
surance, workers who lose their jobs are forced to turn to entrepreneurship to generate
some income, rather than simply live for a short time on unemployment benefits. However,
entrepreneurship takes time (e.g. set up costs, monitoring employees, making business de-
cisions, etc.) that could otherwise be used to search for new work. In developed countries,
these unemployment benefits afford the opportunity to search more intensely for work,
allowing them to quickly leave unemployment and re-enter the workforce. So while the
unemployed in developed countries quickly return to their preferred occupation, those in
developing countries get “stuck” in entrepreneurship, even though their comparative ad-
vantage may be as a worker.
The quantitative results suggest that this framework is able to generate need-based
entrepreneurship, but has very little quantitative impact. Future research will address this
shortcoming.
This paper joins the rapidly expanding literature on misallocation of inputs, includ-
ing Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011b), Midrigan and Xu (2010),
and Moll (2012) emphasize financial distortions to generate misallocation of physical cap-
ital across firms, and find varying degrees of quantitative importance, while Greenwood,
Sanchez, and Wang (2010) show that financial intermediation costs across countries can
have a large quantitative impact. This paper utilizes similar financial distortions to also
generate misallocation of ability across occupations. However, while the lack of search
frictions in these models imply efficient occupational choice, the frictions that distort this
choice are the focus of this paper. More similar to this paper, Poschke (2010) develops a
model in which skill-biased technology generates two entrepreneurship cutoffs, so that a
group of low-skilled individuals choose to be entrepreneurs. While this generates a mass
of smaller and less productive firms, it shares the feature of the aforementioned papers that
occupational choice is undistorted. This paper is also related to recent work in which labor
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market frictions are built into growth models with incomplete markets, including Alvarez
and Veracierto (2001), Krusell et al. (2008), Krusell, Mukoyama, and S¸ahin (2010), and
Krusell et al. (2011). As in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), I find that a certain level of
unemployment insurance can increase aggregate productivity. Due to a difference in focus,
none of these papers include entrepreneurship.
3.2 Empirical Motivation
This paper is motivated by the fact that a significant fraction of the population works as
entrepreneurs because they cannot find work. This implies that a number of firms are run
by low-skilled entrepreneurs. For evidence of this, I turn to the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor Surveys (GEM).2 The GEM are harmonized national surveys of entrepreneurship
in over fifty countries, from 2001 to 2010. Specifically helpful for this paper, they include
a number of developing countries, the poorest of which is Uganda. Because the questions
and results are standardized across countries, the GEM are useful for cross-country com-
parisons. Furthermore, the surveys are designed to capture all residual claimants, meaning
that the survey is not limited to formal sector firms or firms with a sufficiently large work-
force.
To capture the idea of need-based entrepreneurship, the survey asks “Why do you
operate your business?” The possible responses are
1. To take advantage of a business opportunity
2. Because I had no other options
3. Some combination of the two
4. Do not know/refuse to answer
2Although the dataset is relatively new, this is certainly not the first paper to utilize it. See, for example,
Poschke (2010) for the use of this dataset in an aggregate cross-country study.
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I take those that answer “Because I had no other options,” and “Some combination
of the two” to be my measure of self-employment.3
To construct my sample from the dataset, I take the most recent year with sufficient
data for every country available. As a measure of a income level, I use real GDP per capita
from the same year. This is from the Penn World Table version 7.0. The resulting dataset
gives a cross-sectional view of entrepreneurship across countries. Further details are given
in Appendix . Figure 3.1 shows a strong negative correlation between income level and the
fraction of entrepreneurs that are need-based.4
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Figure 3.1: Fraction of Entrepreneurs that are Self-Employed
Figure 3.1 shows that while only thirteen percent of U.S. entrepreneurs are need-
based, that number rises to over sixty percent in Uganda. Even in other developing coun-
tries, the fraction of need-based entrepreneurs is well above thirty percent.
3Other definitions yield similar results.
4This result is certainly not unique to this paper. Poschke (2010), for example, also documents this fact.
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3.3 Model
Time is discrete and infinite, running t = 0,1,2, . . .. There is a measure one of infinitely
lived individuals, who maximize total lifetime utility
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t [log(ct)+u(1−ht)]
in which β < 1 is the discount factor, ct is consumption, and ht is total effort in period t.
The function for disutility of effort is given by
u(1−ht) = γ (1−ht)
1−σ −1
1−σ .
Each individual is endowed with one unit of time and ability vector zt = (zet ,zwt) where zet
is entrepreneurial ability and zwt is ability as a worker. This ability evolves jointly according
to the autoregressive process
log(zt+1) = ρ log(zt)+Γ
Let Q(zt+1,zt) by the transition function for z. Individuals accumulate assets at , and are
constrained to hold non-negative assets.
There are three mutually exclusive occupations: worker w, entrepreneur e, or un-
employed u. An entrepreneur operates a technology that employs workers. It is assumed
that being a worker or entrepreneur requires a fixed amount of effort, h¯ > 0.
Capital and Labor Markets
The labor market is somewhat similar to that proposed in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001),
although I make a number of simplifying assumptions. There are two islands in the econ-
omy: a “working” island, that includes all entrepreneurs and workers, and a “unemployed”
island, where the unemployed live. The working island is a competitive labor market,
which implies that entrepreneurs pay a wage w per unit of labor services. This wage clears
the market.
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Only the unemployed can search for work. If an unemployed individual exerts
effort h searching, he finds the working island with probability hη , where η < 1. Once
employed, a worker is on the working island, and even if his employer disbands his firm,
he can immediately find a new job on the island. However, all workers are exogenously
separated from the working island with probability λ . If this occurs, the individual can
either become unemployed or become an entrepreneur, but he cannot work.
Unemployed individuals also receive a payment b per period of being unemployed.
This is financed by a government tax τ on entrepreneur wage payments. The government
is subject to a balanced budget.
In terms of the capital market, there is a competitive financial intermediary who
takes in all assets at the beginning of the period t and lends capital to entrepreneurs at the
rental rate r. At the end of period t, the intermediary pays back (1+R)a to an individual
who deposited a assets. The zero profit condition for the intermediary implies r = R+ δ ,
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
Contracting between the intermediary and entrepreneurs is subject to limited en-
forcement. If entrepreneur with assets a rents capital k, he can renege on the contract and
steal (1/∆)k. The punishment is that the intermediary takes the deposited assets a. This
leads to a simple collateral constraint k≤ ∆a, as in Buera and Shin (2010) and Moll (2012).
The parameter ∆ ∈ [1,+∞) indexes the financial development of the country, and spans be-
tween complete self-financing (∆ = 1) and perfect contracting markets as ∆ approaches
infinity.
Timing and Recursive Formulation
With the labor and capital market assumptions, the aggregate state of this economy is
the three-dimensional distribution across assets a, ability z, and occupations o, defined
as µ(z,a,o). Because I investigate the stationary competitive equilibrium, I suppress the
dependence of the value functions on µ .
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A worker enters time t with ability z and assets a. His income is equal to wages w.
He chooses to consume c and save a′ ≥ 0. At the start of t + 1, he becomes unemployed
with probability λ . If he is separated, he must choose between being unemployed or an
entrepreneur at t + 1. If he is not separated, he can choose to quit his job and become
unemployed. Given all this, the value of being a worker at time t can be written as
vw(z,a) = max
a′,c
log(c)+u(1− h¯)+β
∫
z
[
λ max{vu(z′,a′),ve(z′,a′}
+(1−λ )max{vu(z′,a′),vw(z′,a′),ve(z′,a′}
]
Q(dz′,z)
s.t. c+a′ = (1+R)a+w
a′ ≥ 0
where vu is the value of being unemployed.
An entrepreneur enters at time t with ability z and assets a. He chooses inputs
capital, k, and labor services, n, to produce output according to the production function
y(ze) = zψe k
θn1−ψ−θ
As discussed above, contracting is subject to limited enforcement, implying the additional
constraint k≤ ∆a. Entrepreneurs are also taxed at rate τ to finance unemployment benefits.
His profit is then
pi(z,a) = zψe k
θn1−ψ−θ − rk− (1+ τ)wn
Entrepreneurship requires the same time commitment as working, so his effort is
h¯. At the end of period t, the entrepreneur realizes tomorrow’s productivity z′. Once he
realizes z′, he can choose to remain an entrepreneur or become unemployed. The value
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function for a current entrepreneur with individual state (z,a) is therefore
ve(z,a) = max
k,n,c
log(c)+u(1− h¯)+β
∫
z′
max{ve(z′,a′),vu(z′,a′)}Q(dz′,z)
s.t. c+a′ = (1+R)a+ zψe k
θn1−ψ−θ − rk−wn
k ≤ ∆a
a′ ≥ 0
The first constraint is the budget equation, and the second is a financial friction.
An unemployed individual receives income only through interest on his assets a and
unemployment benefits bs. He can also choose search intensity h. Unlike entrepreneurs or
workers, the unemployed have no other time obligations, so that total effort is equal to h.
Therefore, the value of being unemployed with ability z and assets a is
vu(z,a) = max
hs,c,a′
log(c)+u(1−h)+β
∫
z′
[
(1−hη)max{ve(z′,a′),vu(z′,a′)}
+hη max{ve(z′,a′),vw(z′,a′),vu(z′,a′)}
]
Q(dz′,z)
s.t. c+a′ = (1+R)a+b
a′ ≥ 0
h ∈ [0,1]
Stationary Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium in this economy is a distribution µ(z,a,o) such that µ(z,a,o) =
Λ(µ(z,a,o)), value functions ve, vw, and vu, decision rules k, n, h, φ , and prices r, R, and
w such that
1. Given prices, ve, vw, and vu solve the individual’s problem with the associated deci-
sion rules
2. Intermediaries make zero profit: r = R+δ
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3. µ is consistent with the decision rules and Q(z,z′)
4. The government budget balances
b
∫
o=u
dµ = τw
∫
o=e
n(z,a,o)dµ
5. Markets clear:
(a) Labor market: ∫
o=e
n(z,a,o)dµ =
∫
o=w
zwdµ
(b) Capital market ∫
adµ =
∫
o=e
k(z,a,o)dµ
(c) Consumption market
∫
c(z,a,o)dµ+δ
∫
o=e
k(z,a,o)dµ =
∫
o=e
zψe k(z,a,o)
θn(z,a,o)1−ψ−θdµ
Need-Based Entrepreneurship in the Model
The GEM surveys break entrepreneurs into two groups. There are those who are en-
trepreneurs to take advantage of a business opportunity, and those who are entrepreneurs
because they have no other options. I want to map these groups into “opportunity-based”
and “need-based” entrepreneurs. Luckily, the model allows a simple mapping between
the empirical statistics and model individuals’ responses. If I were to ask individuals in
the model the same GEM question, those who prefer entrepreneurship to working would
answer “to take advantage of a business opportunity.” These are individuals in the model
that are entrepreneurs with ve(z,a)≥ vw(z,a). Those that would answer “because I had no
other option” are those that are employed as entrepreneurs, but would prefer to be workers.
They therefore have ve(z,a)< vw(z,a). Therefore, the total share of the population that are
need-based entrepreneurs in the stationary equilibrium is
NE =
∫
o=e
1[vw(z,a)> ve(z,a)]dµ (3.3.1)
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where 1[·] is the indicator function. The population of opportunity-based entrepreneurs is
OE =
∫
o=e
1[vw(z,a)≤ ve(z,a)]dµ (3.3.2)
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter lays out a model that may have the potential to account for differences in
need-based entrepreneurship across country. Future work will expand on quantifying the
model.
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3.5 Labor Share Parameter, η
Estimates of the labor share vary substantially. In this section, I consider the how changes
in the agricultural labor share parameter, η , impact the predictions of the model. As a
share of value added, payments to labor are generally estimated to be below 0.50.5 This
implies that as a share of total output, the labor share is almost certainly below 0.40. I
therefore use this as the upper bound, and vary η ∈ {0.2,0.3,0.4} while holding the rest of
the calibration fixed. Table 3.1 lists the results.
Table 3.1: Model Results for Different η
Labor Productivity Gap pxX/paYa Na (%)
Economy Agriculture Aggregate Rich Poor Rich Poor
Data 63.7 23.1 0.40 0.09 2.8 82.0
Model with
η = 0.40 33.5 7.5 0.40 0.22 2.8 56.8
η = 0.30 47.3 6.5 0.40 0.25 1.0 41.2
η = 0.20 76.2 5.6 0.40 0.30 0.01 27.0
Increasing η causes agricultural productivity differences to decrease, while aggre-
gate productivity differences increase. This is due to two forces that work in opposite
directions. First, higher η causes agricultural productivity to decrease in both economies.
Because the rate of decrease is higher in the rich country, agricultural output per worker
differences decrease. At the same time however, higher η causes the employment share
in agriculture to increase. The rate of this increase in higher in the poor economy. Be-
cause aggregate productivity is an employment-weighted average of sectoral productivity,
aggregate productivity differences tilt towards agricultural productivity differences. This
increases aggregate productivity differences as η increases. Higher η also implies that the
intermediate input share decreases in the poor economy. Because the parameter on inter-
mediate inputs, ψ , is held fixed, higher η decreases the span of control of the production
function, which decreases expected income to villages. To limit exposure to risk, villages
decrease investment in intermediate inputs.
Overall, the model’s basic predictions stand up to varying the labor share parameter
in the production function.
3.6 Changes in the Shock Distribution
I investigate the importance of the shock distribution. I do so by varying the standard
deviation of the underlying normal distribution σz, while holding the support z and z fixed.
The results are presented in Table 3.2.
Interestingly, the higher the standard deviation of the shock distribution, the smaller
productivity differences get, and the higher the intermediate input share in the poor econ-
5For further discussion, see Herrendorf and Schoellman (2012).
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Table 3.2: Model Results for Different σz
Labor Productivity Gap pxX/paYa Na (%)
Economy Agriculture Aggregate Rich Poor Rich Poor
Data 63.7 23.1 0.40 0.09 2.8 82.0
Model with
σz = 0.59 33.5 7.5 0.40 0.22 2.8 56.8
σz = 0.75 29.8 6.3 0.40 0.27 1.8 44.6
σz = 0.85 29.4 5.9 0.40 0.38 1.7 40.9
σz = 0.95 28.9 5.6 0.40 0.29 1.5 37.8
omy. This is due to the interaction of the low utility weight on agricultural consumption, α ,
and subsistence requirements a¯. Intuitively, because α is so low, total agricultural output
needs to be roughly a¯. When σz is low, the price pa must increase to incentivize people to
produce with risky intermediate inputs. As σz increases, a larger and larger number of vil-
lages “luck” into a good shock, and are able to produce a¯ and the equilibrium price remains
low.
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I make use of the publicly available data from Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) for
statistics on aggregate productivity, agricultural productivity, labor, and intermediate input
prices. This is augmented with purchasing power parities (PPP) for agricultural output
and nonagricultural intermediate inputs from Prasada Rao (1993). The resulting dataset
contains 84 countries, which are:
Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica,Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti,
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papau New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K. U.S.A.
Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
I am interested a measure of the ninetieth percentile country relative to the tenth
percentile country, similar to that used in Caselli (2005). As a measure of the rich country, I
take average of the top ten percent of countries. Listed from largest to smallest income, they
are USA, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany.
As a measure of the “tenth” percentile, I take an average of the countries that make up the
bottom fifteen to five percent of countries, as ranked by PPP GDP per capita. They are
Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Uganda, Malawi, Chad, Zaire and Niger.
The productivity statistics are taken from Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008). They
are derived from PWT and FAO data. These averages imply a factor of 63.66 difference
in agricultural output per worker and 23.18 difference in aggregate output per worker. On
average, 82% of the population in the poor countries work in agriculture.
As in the text, the domestic intermediate share in agriculture of country j is
X̂ j :=
p jxX j
p jaY
j
a
(3.6.1)
This measure is not directly reported in Prasada Rao (1993). He does however, report the
real intermediate share in agriculture, defined as
X̂ j∗ :=
p∗xX j
p∗aY
j
a
(3.6.2)
where p∗x and p∗a are international prices of intermediate inputs and agricultural output.
Combining equations (3.6.1) and (3.6.2), it is possible to write the domestic intermediate
share as
X̂ j = X̂ j∗
(
p jx/p∗x
p ja/p∗a
)
(3.6.3)
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The price ratio in equation (3.6.3) can be calculated from reported purchasing power pari-
ties
PPP ja =
p ja
p∗a
PPP jx =
p jx
p∗x
where p∗a and p∗x are international (unreported) prices and (p
j
a, p
j
x) are (unreported) domes-
tic prices for country j. The purchasing power parities are normalized to one in a baseline
country, which in Prasada Rao (1993) is the USA. Therefore, PPPUSa = PPP
US
x = 1, imply-
ing X̂US = X̂US∗. Therefore, calculating the domestically priced intermediate share of all
other countries reduces to
X̂ j = X̂ j∗
(
PPP jx
PPP ja
)
(3.6.4)
As mentioned, the real intermediate share and the ratio of PPPs are both reported, so this is
sufficient to define the domestically priced intermediate input share. The poor group group
of countries has, on average, a domestically priced intermediate input share of 0.09 and a
real intermediate input share of 0.13. The right hand side of equation (3.6.4) is the statistic
reported in Figure 1.1. The horizontal axis, GDP per capita, is real GDP per capita for
1985, variable cgdp from the Penn World Tables version 7.0 (PWT).
For the comparison of agriculture to manufacturing and services, I use a set of 49
countries from the UN SNA. The 49 countries with sufficient data for all three sectors
Austria, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Hong
Kong, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia,
Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Lux-
embourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Portugal,
Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab
Republic, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
From the UN SNA, I use “Output, at basic prices” and “Intermediate consumption,
at purchaser’s prices” for the year 1985 for each of the three sectors. Dividing them gives
the domestically priced intermediate input share by sector. Figure 1.2 plots this, along with
variable cgdp for 1985 from PWT on the horizontal axis. Note that the intermediate share
in agriculture derived from the UN statistics and the FAO statistics may differ. This is due
to the fact that the UN statistics includes intermediate inputs produced in the agricultural
sector, while the FAO statistics only consider nonagricultural intermediate inputs.
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3.7 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. First, the profit maximizing first order condition implies
xC
pCaYCa
= ψ (3.7.1)
Define x∗ be the optimal choice for a farmer facing pIa, but with complete markets. Then
the first order condition implies,
x∗
pIaY ∗a
= ψ (3.7.2)
Comparing (3.7.1) and (3.7.2), the proposition is equivalent to proving that at the price pIa,
xI < x∗. This can be seen from the first order conditions. The first order condition from the
ordering problem is
A(pIa)
1/(1−η)F ′(xI)
∫
Z
z1/(1−η)
(
u˜′(y(xI,z))
Ez[u˜′(y(xI,z))]
)
dQ(z) = 1 (3.7.3)
where F(·) and u˜ are defined as in the text. Note that F(·) is concave because ψ+η < 1.
Now, consider the profit maximizing problem. The first order condition is
A(pIa)
1/(1−η)F ′(x∗)
∫
Z
z1/(1−η)dQ(z) = 1 (3.7.4)
Since u(·) is concave,∫
Z
z1/(1−η)
(
u˜′(y(x∗,z))
Ez[u˜′(y(x∗,z))]
)
dQ(z)<
∫
Z
z1/(1−η)dQ(z) (3.7.5)
Since F(·) is concave, it follows that xI < x∗. 
3.8 An Additional Lemma for the Proof of Proposition 2
To prove the result, I first characterize the the equilibrium of an I economy with TFP A2
and a¯ = 0 in terms of an economy with TFP A1 and a¯ = 0. This is done in Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1. Consider two I economies characterized by TFP levels A1 and A2, both with
a¯ = 0. Denote the equilibrium for economy 1 as (x1,n1a(z), p
1
a). Then the equilibrium for
economy 2, (x2,n2a(z), p
2
a) can be characterized as
n2a(z) = n
1
a(z)
x2 =
(
A2
A1
)
x1
p2a =
(
A1
A2
)ψ
p1a
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Proof. Two things must be checked for the proposed allocation to be a competitive equilib-
rium. First, the proposed equilibrium must satisfy the village optimization problem. That
is, if (p1a,x
1,n1a(z)) is an equilibrium in economy 1, then (p
2
a,x
2,n2a(z)) satisfies the farmer’s
optimization problem in economy 2. Second, markets must clear. These are considered in
turn.
The first thing to check is that the labor choice is identical between the two. Using
the decision rules, I can check this using the first order conditions for n1a(z) and n
2
a(z).
n1a(z)
n2a(z)
=
(
p1aA
1(x1)ψ
p2aA2(x2)ψ
)1/(1−η)
Plugging in (p2a,x
2) implies
n1a(z)
n2a(z)
= 1
For simplicity, I drop the superscript on na(z), with the understanding that they are identical
in both economies.
Next up is to check if x2 satisfy the required first order conditions, given that x1
satisfies the first order condition in Economy One. Note that when a¯ = 0, the production
utility for a given income y can be written as
V P(y) = α log(c1a)+(1−α) log(c1m)
= Ω−α log(p1a)+ log(y) (3.8.1)
where Ω = α log(α)+ (1−α) log(1−α). Denote the income of a farmer who chooses
intermediates x and gets hit with shock z in economy j = 1,2 as
y j(x,z) = p jaA
jzxψna(z)η − x+(1−na(z))A j
Plugging in the proposed equilibrium yields the following relationship
y2(x2,z) =
(
A2
A1
)
y1(x1,z) (3.8.2)
Equation (3.8.1) implies that
x j = argmax
x
∫
Z
log(y j(x,z))dQ(z)
After plugging in the optimal values for na(z), the first order condition for this problem can
be written as ∫ z¯
z
(
ψ p jazA jx jψna(z)η −1
y j(x,z)
)
= 0
Plugging in the proposed equilibrium yields a relationship between economies one and two∫ z¯
z
(
ψ p2azA2x2ψna(z)η −1
y2(x,z)
)
=
(
A1
A2
)∫ z¯
z
(
ψ p1azA1x1ψna(z)η −1
y1(x j,z)
)
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Since an equilibrium is assumed in economy one, it follows then that∫ z¯
z
(
ψ p2azA2x2ψna(z)η −1
y2(x,z)
)
= 0
Therefore, the proposed economy two equilibrium satisfies a village’s optimization prob-
lem.
To check market clearing, first note that aggregate sector a output for economy
j = 1,2 is
Y ja = Ax
jψEz(zna(z)η)
Thus,
Y 1a
Y 2a
=
(
A1
A2
)(
x1
x2
)ψ
(3.8.3)
Therefore, at the proposed equilibrium,
Y 1a
Y 2a
=
(
A1
A2
)1+ψ
(3.8.4)
For any a¯≥ 0, the total demand for sector a consumption is given by
D ja = (1−α)a¯+
α
p ja
Ez[y j(X j,z)] (3.8.5)
Using equation (3.8.2),
Ez[y1(x1,z)]
Ez[y2(x2,z)]
=
A1
A2
(3.8.6)
Since a¯ = 0, equations (3.8.5) and (3.8.6) and the prices p1a and p
2
a imply that
D1a
D2a
=
(
A1
A2
)1+ψ
(3.8.7)
Since the proof assumes an equilibrium in economy 1, equations (3.8.4) and (3.8.7) imply
Y 2a = D
2
a so that the agricultural output market clears in economy two. Since the labor
market in sector m clears trivially, Walras’ Law implies that the sector m output market
also clears. 
3.9 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. With Lemma 1 in hand, the three claims of the proposition follow quickly.
na(z) is independent of A
This follows directly from Lemma 1.
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The intermediate input share is independent of A
Denote Xˆ j as the intermediate good share in economy j = 1,2, so that Xˆ j is defined as
Xˆ j =
x j
p jaY
j
a
(3.9.1)
First, note that total agricultural output in economy j is given as
Y ja = A
j(x j)ψEz(zn ja(z)η) (3.9.2)
Using the fact that n1a(z) = n
2
a(z) and plugging (3.9.2) into (3.9.1) gives
Xˆ1
Xˆ2
=
(
x1
x2
)1−ψ( p2a
p1a
)(
A2
A1
)
Plugging in the equilibrium found in Lemma 1, this gives
Xˆ1
Xˆ2
=
(
A1
A2
)1−ψ(A1
A2
)ψ(A2
A1
)
= 1
Since A1 and A2 are arbitrary, this completes the proof.
No increase in productivity relative to C economy
For any two economies characterized by TFP A1 and A2 and complete markets (the C
economy), it is easy to show that in equilibrium,
n1a = n
2
a
x2 =
(
A2
A1
)
x1
Since this is the same as in the incomplete markets model (the I economy), relative agri-
cultural labor productivity between the two economies is equal in both.

3.10 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider the equilibrium for economy 1 with TFP equal to A1. Denote this equi-
librium (p1a,x
1,n1a(z)). Suppose that the intermediate good share is Xˆ
1 < ψ , where the in-
equality follows from Proposition 1. Define x1C to be the optimal choice of the farmer who
faces p1a but with complete markets. I know that the intermediate good share is Xˆ
1C = ψ .
Therefore, the ratio is
Xˆ1
Xˆ1C
=
Xˆ1
ψ
=
(
x1
x1C
)(1−η−ψ)/(1−η)
Thus, I can write Xˆ1 as
Xˆ1 = ψ
(
x1
x1C
)(1−η−ψ)/(1−η)
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Similarly, it follows that in Economy 2,
Xˆ2 = ψ
(
x2
x2C
)(1−η−ψ)/(1−η)
These equations show that the intermediate good share is directly related to how “far” the
optimal choice of x is from the choice xC. What’s left to show is that when a¯ > 0 and
A1 > A2,
x1
x1C
>
x2
x2C
This follows from the fact that, when a¯ > 0, relative income net of subsistence,
y1(z)− p1aa¯
y2(z)− p2aa¯
is decreasing in z. 
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The data used was collected by ICRISAT. I use the version that was released by
Stefan Dercon, via the Oxford University website. It is publicly available at
http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members/stefan.dercon/icrisat/ICRISAT/oldvls.html.
The ICRISAT VLS is an unbalanced panel set covering 10 villages in India. The
data covers the time period 1975 - 1984. The goal is to calculate the value of the following
inputs at the village-year-season level: capital K, agricultural intermediates I, nonagricul-
tural intermediates X , human labor hours Na, and land L. Allowing for some abuse of
notation, let these letters also denote the set of all inputs of that type, so K is the set of all
capital goods in the economy, for example.
3.11 Construction of Inputs
The data includes five inputs: capital, human labor, non-agricultural intermediates, and
agricultural intermediates. Each input category includes a number of different inputs, with
quantities measured in different denominations. The first step is to put all inputs in a given
category into units of a numeraire good using relative prices. The second step is then to
construct a quantity index using the time series of the numeraire good. These are discussed
in detail below.
A time period here is a season, and each year contains three seasons. So time t here
should be read as a season-year pair.
Capital includes class code E, farm equipment and implements and class code M,
major farm machinery, class code R, production capital assets, and the total value of land.
Class code E includes basic farm equipment such as plows and hoes. Class code M includes
major machinery such as tractors and electric pumps. Capital also includes bullock labor
hours at the plot level, from both owned and rented bullocks. The value of an hour of an
owned bullock is imputed from the rental rates of hired bullock hours, so they are valued
equally.
The total value of capital at time t in village v can be computed simply by summing
over the capital goods, and adding in the value of bullock labor V B and land V L.
V K1p, f ,v,t =
(
∑
k∈K
Vk, f ,p,v,t
)
+V Bf ,p,v,t +V
L
f ,p,v,t ∀ (p, f ,v, t)
The most commonly used capital good is the electric pump, code MK, so I compute
the price pMKv,t =V
MK
p, f ,v,t/Q
MK
p, f ,v,t . From there, I put capital in terms of units of MK by simply
dividing through by pMK
V K2p, f ,v,t =
V K1p, f ,v,t
pMKv,t
∀ (p, f ,v, t).
The last step is to construct the quantity of capital, by using the time series pMK to
get rid of price changes. Therefore, the total quantity of capital used on plot p on farm f in
94
village v at time t can be written as
QKp, f ,v,t =
V K2p, f ,v,t
pMKv,0
From there, I simply sum up and get the quantity of capital for village v at time t
QKv,t =∑
p, f
QKp, f ,v,t
The rest of the inputs are constructed similarly. For labor, the Y files give hours
of male, female, and child labor in the data. Since I calibrate to match the fraction of
the population over 15 years of age, I include only male and female labor. Child labor
is a small component with the lowest price (i.e. not as productive as an adult laborer).
Including it makes no discernible difference. Similar to bullock labor hours, the Y files
include disaggregated data on both family and hired workers. Once again though, the value
of family labor is imputed from market value, so they are valued equally. Nonagricultural
intermediates include pesticides, which are input codes 1A−9A, and fertilizer (input codes
A−Z). Agricultural intermediates can be included by using the Y files. Organic manure in
the data are inputs 1−7. Seed is denoted as inputs CA−ZK. The quantity and values are
in the Y files.
3.12 Output
Total value of output is given by summing over output values in the Y files by plot level.
I include both actual production and by-products produced by farming. The procedure is
identical to the one discussed above for inputs. The only difference is that each village
produces a different (but not mutually exclusive) set of goods at output, and therefore each
village gets a different numeraire output good.
3.13 Decomposition of Residuals
Now armed with input vector (K,L,Na, I,X)v,t and output Yv,t , I can calculate the residual
z∗v,t =
Y av,t− Iv,t
Xψvt N
η
a,vt(Kvt +Lvt)1−ψ−η
where η and ψ are taken from the calibration in the main text. The rest is explained
in the main text.
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I take several historical data series as exogenous to the model, and this section
details the construction of those series. Data are taken from several sources in order to con-
struct a consistent series since 1900. From 1900 to 1958, most data were collected every
two years and published in the Biennial Survey of Education (BSE). Since 1962, the Digest
of Education Statistics (DES) has been published annually. Other publications including
the annual U.S. Statistical Abstract, the Bicentennial Edition “Historical Statistics of the
United States: Colonial Times to 1970”, and “120 Years of American Education: A Sta-
tistical Portrait” help in bridging breaks between series, as well as verifying continuity of
series that may have changed names from year to year. Also, many data were revised in
later publications, so I take the most recent published estimates where available.
First, let ct be the total annual cost of college per student. I assume that the total
cost for educating all students in the U.S. in a given year equals the total revenues received
in the current period by all institutions of higher education. Dividing this by the total
enrollment each year yields the total annual cost per student. Alternatively, one could
use the total current expenditures rather than revenues as the measure of total cost, but
this makes little difference quantitatively because revenues and expenditures track each
other quite closely. In addition, the revenue data is preferable because it allows us to
determine how much of costs are paid out-of-pocket by students for tuition and fees, and
how much comes from other sources such as state, local, and federal governments, private
gifts, endowment earnings, auxiliary enterprises (athletics, dormitories, meal plans, etc.),
and other sources. The numerator for ct is constructed as follows:
• 1997-2000: total current revenue must be computed as the sum of current-fund rev-
enue for public and private institutions, from the DES.
• 1976-1996: total current revenue equals “current-fund revenue of institutions of
higher education” from the DES.
• 1932-1975: total current revenue equals “current-fund revenue of institutions of
higher education” in “120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait”.
• 1908-1930: total current revenue equals “total receipts exclusive of additions to en-
dowment” for colleges, universities, and professional schools, from the BSE.
• 1900-1908: total current revenue equals “total receipts exclusive of additions to en-
dowment” for colleges, universities, and professional schools, and is computed as
(income per student)*(total students, excluding duplicates) from the BSE. Continu-
ity with later years can be verified using the “income per student” series, which was
published from 1890-1920.
The denominator for ct is constructed as follows:
• 1946-2000: total fall enrollment for institutions of higher education, from the DES.
• 1938-1946: resident college enrollments, from the BSE. Continuity with the later
series can be verified in that year 1946 data matches in both.
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• 1900-1938: total students, excluding duplicates, in colleges, universities, and profes-
sional schools, from the BSE. Continuity with the later series can be verified in that
year 1938 data matches in both.
Second, I construct two time series which estimate the share of annual college costs
paid out-of-pocket by students. One measure, λt , includes only tuition and fees paid by
students, and the other measure, φt includes tuition, fees, room, and board. In each year λt
equals total tuition and fees paid by all students divided by total current revenue received by
institutions of higher education. Similarly, φt equals total tuition, fees, room, and board aid
by all students divided by total current revenue received by institutions of higher education.
In each case, the measure of total current revenue is the same time series as was used above
in constructing ct . The time series for λt is constructed as follows:
• 1997-2000: current fund revenues from tuition and fees for all institutions of higher
education is computed as the sum of the series for public and private institutions,
from the DES.
• 1976-1996: current fund revenues from student tuition and fees, from the DES.
• 1930-1975: current fund revenues from student tuition and fees, from “120 Years of
American Education: A Statistical Portrait”.
• 1918-1930: receipts of universities, colleges, and professional schools for student
tuition and fees, from BSE.
• 1900-1918: I am unable to obtain proper data for these years.
The time series for φt is constructed as follows:
• 1976-2000: Average tuition, fees, room, and board paid by full-time equivalent
(FTE) students is obtained from the DES. I multiply this by enrollment of FTE stu-
dents, also from the DES, and divide by the current fund revenues to compute φt .
• 1960-1976: I am unable to obtain proper data for these years.
• 1932-1958: Data available biennially on 1total revenues from student tuition and
fees, as well as revenue from auxiliary enterprises and activities (room and board),
in the BSE. φt computed as the sum of these, divided by total current revenue.
• 1900-1930: φt computed as total revenue from student fees (included tuition, fees,
room, and board) divided by total current revenue.
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